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Abstract
In this dissertation, I offer two independent studies that each contribute to the litera-
ture on the college choices. The first paper examines the impact of Arizona’s merit based
scholarship on college enrollment decisions. I find that both enrollment and tuition and fees
increased at Arizona’s three large public institutions after the implementation of the AIMS
scholarship. Enrollment effects are strongest among black and hispanic students. The second
paper examines the impact of the recent 2009 housing crisis on college enrollment decisions.
I find that large reductions in housing wealth lead to increases in public school enrollment
and decreases in private school enrollment. Similarly, I find that increases in foreclosures
in a metro area are associated with decreases in private school enrollment and increases in
public school enrollment.
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Chapter 1. Introduction
When I compare the generation in which I grew up to my parents’ generation, there are
two very distinct differences that are apparent. First, the probability that one my peers
attended college is much higher than that of my parents’ peers. Second, home ownership
increased substantially during this generation due to the general perception that owning a
home is a “good investment”. Due to the recent housing collapse, many in my generation are
much more skeptical about home ownership. This dissertation will discuss the relationship
between these seemingly unrelated societal changes that have occurred in recent decades.
1.1 College Enrollment
College enrollment has increased drastically over the past several decades (Turner, 2004)1,
but also has the cultural expectations around college enrollment (Turner, 2004).2 Young
adults no longer consider a college education a luxury good that some will have the oppor-
tunity to consume. Instead, more and more I see my peers referring to a college degree as
a birthright available for all who are fortunate enough to be born in this country. We have
seen this sentiment echoed in our politics, as both the federal and state governments are
spending billions each year to subsidize higher education. Here in Louisiana alone, students
who meet basic GPA and ACT requirements in high school, regardless of income or any
other means test, will receive a four-year, full tuition scholarship, called TOPS, to an in-
state public institution.3 Furthermore, low income families are eligible for additional state
1“Among individuals aged twenty-three in 1970, 23 percent of high school graduates had completed a BA
degree, while about 51 percent had enrolled in college for one time period since high school graduation. For
the same age group in 1999, the share of high school graduates who had enrolled in college at some point
rose substantially, to 67 percent, while the share receiving a BA degree rose only slightly, to 24 percent of
the cohort.”
2“That a college education is more important now than ever is certainly cliché.
3TOPS is an acronym for “Taylor Opportunity Program for Students.”
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aid, called Pelican Promise. In addition, low income students are also eligible for Federal
Pell Grants.
When my parents graduated from high school in the late 1970s, not a single state offered
a TOPS like program and today at least fifteen states offer similar programs. Also when my
parents graduated from high school, total Pell Grant funding was just shy of $5.7 billion in
2012 dollars. In 2012 over $32 billion was spent on Pell Grants.4 Simply put, more people
are attending college today than ever before and this is likely–at least partially–due to the
increase in student aid at both state and federal levels.
Figure 1.1 shows the growth of college enrollment nationwide in the United States over
the past 40 years alongside the Federal expenditures on Pell Grants and the number of
recipients of Pell Grants.
Figure 1.1: College Enrollment and Pell Grants
4CollegeBoard Advocacy & Policy Center.
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All three of these series have increased substantially over this time period. Furthermore,
there is a break from trend on all three of these series that occurs during the most recent
Great Recession.
While it is impossible to deny the increasing importance that our country is placing on
higher education, the reason for this cultural shift is not clear. This dissertation will discuss
the growth in scholarship programs and empirically analyze one scholarship in particular–the
Arizona AIMS scholarship–and how it impacted college enrollment in Arizona.
1.2 Housing Wealth
An integral part of the “American Dream” has always been home ownership. The concept of
ownership is integral to a capitalist society. Ironically, though, the concept of home ownership
has transformed into bank ownership over the past two generations. The terms of mortgages
available to borrowers has increased over this past century (Hyman, 2012).5 Furthermore,
families are now able to borrow against the equity in their homes for a “Home Equity Line
of Credit” (HELOC) (Hyman, 2012).6 These factors, among others, likely contributed to
the rise in real housing debt that has been documented in the United States (Mian and Sufi,
2011).
It is possible that a large increase in housing wealth also occurred during a period where
housing debt increased. If real housing prices increase substantially, then housing debt too
would logically rise as larger mortgages are needed to purchase the same home. While it
is true that nominal housing prices have increased since the 1980s, real prices have stayed
remarkably constant with the notable exception of the housing bubble and subsequent col-
lapse that occurred during the first decade of the twenty-first century. These trends are
5In the 1920s, the longest possible mortgage was a 10 year mortgage–many of which had balloon payments
in the tenth year. Today, the most common term of a mortgage is 30 years.
6P. 219. “Unlike the debt repayment of the post war period, which relied on rising income, debt repayment
in the 1990s relied on rising asset prices. With rising house prices, home owners could borrow against their
houses and repay their debts, even if their incomes did not rise. Everyone’s house, and the U.S. economy,
became a house of credit cards.”
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illustrated in Figure 1.2. Interestingly, in 2013, housing prices were only 25 percent higher
in real dollars than in 1987.7 This is less than a nine-tenths of one percent increase in real
prices per year over this 26 year period. Therefore, the increase in housing prices does not
tell the whole story about why housing debt has increased.
Figure 1.2: Housing Prices Over Time
Over the past century, Americans have believed that housing prices would consistently
increase over long periods of time. This belief drove people to purchase larger homes and
borrow more money, because after all, the price of the house would increase. This was most
famously discussed by recent (2013) nobel laureate Robert Shiller (Schiller, 2005). He refers
to the cultural phenomenon as “irrational exuberance” a term her borrowed from a speech
made by Federal Reserve Chairman, Alan Greenspan (Greenspan, 1996). Schiller describes
a feedback effect in which increased demand for housing fueled by public perception that
housing is a “good investment” lead to increases in housing prices which in turn solidified
7Based on authors calculations.
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the belief that housing prices would continue to rise and drove more demand for housing. It
is this “irrational exuberance” that is at least partially responsible for the real estate bubble
and crash that occurred during the Great Depression of 1929 and Great Recession of 2008.
Like the generation who lived through the great depression, my generation too will likely
be more skeptical about home ownership and have doubts about whether home prices will in-
crease substantially throughout our adult lives. While there is no doubt that home ownership
will continue to be important in American culture, the recent financial crisis has dampened
this excitement and made my generation more hesitant about how home ownership will play
a part in our financial goals. This dissertation will discuss the drastic change in housing
wealth that occurred during the 2008 financial crisis and investigate the extent to which this
impacted college enrollment decisions.
1.3 Overview
This dissertation was motivated by these two observations that have manifested themselves
into two essays that each contribute to the literature on college choices. In the second chapter,
I investigate the impact of Arizona’s AIMS scholarship on a variety of educational outcomes
including college enrollment and tuition and fees at Arizona’s three large public universities.
In the third chapter, I analyze the impact of housing wealth on college enrollment. Taking
advantage of the 2009 housing crash as an exogenous shock, I analyze the extent to which
college enrollment changes in response to shocks to housing wealth.
The second essay is entitled The Effect of Merit-Based Scholarships on Educational Out-
comes: An Analysis of the Arizona AIMS Scholarship. This paper analyzes the effect of
a statewide merit-based scholarship program on educational outcomes in Arizona. It tests
whether Arizona’s Instrument to Measure Standards (AIMS) scholarship has had an effect on
a comprehensive set of educational outcomes such as the number of applicants, student ad-
missions, first-year first-time enrollment, ACT scores of entering freshman, retention rates,
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as well as on the level of tuition and fees at the three schools targeted by the program;
Arizona State University, University of Arizona and Northern Arizona University. Both
difference-in-differences estimation as well as synthetic control methods shows that AIMS
has an economically and statistically significant effect on many of these outcomes, primar-
ily enrollment and tuition. Enrollment effects are greatest among African American and
Hispanic students and are significant for both men and women.
The third essay is entitled Housing Wealth and College Enrollment. This is the first
paper to explore the relationship between local housing market conditions and enrollment
in institutions of higher education within a metropolitan area. I examine how changes
in housing wealth impact college enrollment decisions within these areas. Housing wealth
indicators are obtained from a large national sample of proprietary loan-level data which
allows us to observe individual loan specific characteristics and outcomes such as value at
origination and payment history. We find that changes in housing wealth impact private
and public institutions differently. The results suggest that enrollment at public schools are
negatively related to housing wealth, while private schools are positively related. Potentially
students are able to substitute from public to private institutions as housing wealth increases.
The findings of these two studies are summarized in Chapter 5.
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Chapter 2. The Effect of Merit-Based
Scholarships on Educational
Outcomes: An Analysis of the
Arizona AIMS Scholarship
2.1 Introduction
In the United States, the federal and state governments spend billions of dollars on higher
education each year.1 Many of these dollars are funneled into federal programs such as Pell
grants, Perkins loans, Stafford loans, and college student tax credits for higher education
expenses. The effectiveness of different types of student aid on an array of outcomes has
been extensively studied (Dynarski, 2004; Bettinger, 2004; Avery and Hoxby, 2004).
Over the past two decades, individual states in the U.S. have created their own statewide
merit-based scholarships to encourage residents to attend colleges and universities in their
home states (Dynarski, 2004).2 While not a single statewide merit-based scholarship existed
before 1991, today there are at least 15 states that provide merit-based scholarships for their
residents.3
Many politicians have touted these programs as successful, yet there are many important
questions that need to be answered.4 Do these scholarships increase the probability that
high school students will attend college? How do students respond to merit aid compared to
1In 2012 the U.S. Department of Education had a discretionary appropriations of $68.1 billion.
2These scholarships are distinctly different than need-based scholarship programs that are also prevalent
in many states. Merit-based aid is available for any student who meets certain criteria laid out by the state,
while need-based aid is for students who qualify based on need, primarily due to guardian’s income being
below a certain threshold.
3These states are Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi,
Nevada, New Mexico, South Carolina, Tennessee, West Virginia, Wyoming, and Arizona.
4In January of 2012, Louisiana Governor Bobby Jindal said the following when asked about the possibility
of capping Louisiana’s Taylor Opportunity Program for Students (TOPS) scholarship. “We remain opposed
to any efforts to cap TOPS. We think it is an important program that has been very successful.”
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need-based aid? Do these scholarships result in regressive income transfers? Do merit-based
scholarships increase the probability of course withdrawals? Do these scholarships cause
grade inflation in high school? Do they increase enrollment at colleges and universities?
Much of the literature attempting to answer these questions has analyzed data from
Georgia’s Helping Outstanding Pupils Educationally (HOPE) scholarship. Dynarski (2004)
investigated HOPE’s effect on an array of educational outcomes in Georgia. She found
that HOPE increased the probability of college attendance by about five to seven percentage
points, and that HOPE was more effective than need-based aid in increasing enrollment. She
also found that the scholarship shifted students toward attending four-year schools instead
of two-year schools.
Cornwell and Mustard (2007) tested whether the HOPE scholarship allowed wealthier
families to substitute money that they otherwise would have spent on tuition for a new
vehicle. They found a significant increase in the number of vehicle registrations in Georgia
after HOPE was implemented, thereby supporting their hypothesis. Cornwell, Lee, and
Mustard (2005) used enrollment records of undergraduates at the University of Georgia
(UGA) to estimate HOPE’s effect on course taking. They concluded that HOPE increased
course withdrawals among freshmen because students in danger of losing their scholarship
were the most likely to withdraw from courses in the first year. The paper also found that
HOPE increased the number of summer school credits earned by students. Buglar, Henry,
and Rubenstein (1999) studied HOPE’s effect on grade inflation in high school but found no
evidence that that the implementation of HOPE created or exacerbated grade inflation in
Georgia.
Cornwell, Mustard, and Sridhar (2006)–hereafter referred to as CMS–tested HOPE’s im-
pact on college enrollment in Georgia. They found that the implementation of HOPE was
associated with a 5.9 percent increase in enrollment, translating into almost 2,900 additional
students enrolled in Georgia colleges and universities per year. They also found that the
rise in enrollment was concentrated in four-year schools–especially private colleges–and that
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the effect on enrollment was smaller for white students than for other races. Finally, the
scholarship led to an increase in the average SAT scores of incoming freshmen at Georgia’s
public colleges and universities. Zhang and Ness (2012) found that the HOPE scholarship
decreases migration of the best and brightest students out of Georgia. On the other hand,
Sjoquist and Winters (2013) argue that the HOPE Scholarship did not increase the percent-
age of students who remain in state after college because students who received the HOPE
scholarship have a high probability of leaving Georgia post graduation.
Recently, there has been interest in merit-based scholarships in other states as well.
Scott-Clayton (2011) tested for the impact of the West Virginia PROMISE program on
“end-of-college” outcomes such as the time it took students to complete a degree. Bruce
and Carruthers (2012) focused on the Tennessee HOPE scholarship and found that students
are more likely to take the ACT multiple times in order to achieve the minimum ACT
score needed for the scholarship. They also found that students who meet the requirements
substitute away from two-year community colleges in favor of four-year colleges. Cohodes and
Goodman (2013) found that Massachusetts’ Adams Scholarship induces high-skilled students
to substitute away from higher quality institutions to enroll in in-state public colleges, which
decreases the probability that the student will graduate.
Other studies have focused on merit scholarships in general, without focusing on specific
programs in specific states. For instance, both Fitzpatrick and Jones (2012) and Sjoquist
and Winters (2014) found that a merit aid program increased the probability that a college
attendee stayed in state post college.
While the insights obtained from these studies are important, it is also valuable to ana-
lyze the impacts of similar programs in other states because many of these programs differ
substantially. This paper tests for the effect of a comprehensive set of outcomes on Ari-
zona’s Instrument to Measure Standards (AIMS) scholarship. It is unknown whether AIMS
will have similar effects on many educational outcomes, as scholarships (1) have different
requirements, (2) are implemented in states with very different demographics, (3) were not
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enacted during the same time period,5 and (4) are available for different subsets of schools
within their respective states.
Because much of the existing literature has focused on the Georgia HOPE scholarship,
I will focus on the differences between the HOPE and AIMS scholarships. For instance,
HOPE and AIMS have substantially different eligibility requirements. In particular, AIMS’
requirements are more stringent than HOPE’s. Currently, it is unknown how much of an
impact scholarship requirements have on a scholarship’s effectiveness at increasing enroll-
ment. The specific differences in the eligibility requirements between HOPE and AIMS will
be discussed in a Section 2.1.1.
Another important difference between the HOPE and AIMS programs is the underlying
demographics in Georgia and Arizona. For example, according to the 2010 census, Hispanics
constitute about 25 percent of Arizona’s population, while they only make up about 5 percent
of Georgia’s population. On the other hand, African Americans make up 28 percent of
the population in Georgia, and only 3 percent of the population in Arizona. Merit-based
scholarships are potentially more effective with different races, and if these races are more
prevalent in different parts of the country, then the scholarships’ effectiveness also might be
different. While I will not be able to test this hypothesis formally, I will test the enrollment
effects of AIMS by race.
A third factor that might have an impact on a scholarship’s effectiveness is the time
period in which the scholarship is implemented. According to Snyder and Dillow (2011),
there were almost 14 million students students enrolled in institutions of higher education
in the fall of 1990. By 2009, this number increased to over 20 million, an increase of 48
percent. During this same time period, the inflation-adjusted average tuition at four-year
institutions increased from $12,185 to $20,986.6 This is an increase of over 72 percent. It is
unknown whether the marginal contribution of a scholarship program today is more or less
5For instance, HOPE and AIMS were implemented 13 years apart.
6These costs include total tuition and room and board rates charged for full-time undergraduate students
in degree-granting institutions in 2008-2009 dollars. Source: National Center for Education Statistics Fast
Facts.
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effective in increasing enrollment than it was several decades ago. It might be hypothesized
that due to major changes in students’ choices to attend college over time, the effectiveness
of scholarship programs on students’ decisions might also have changed over time.
The final and most notable difference between HOPE and AIMS pertains to the type
of colleges at which students can take advantage of the scholarships. HOPE can be used
at any eligible public or private college, university or eligible technical college in Georgia.
AIMS, on the other hand, is only available to students enrolled at one of Arizona’s three
publicly funded universities: Arizona State University (ASU), University of Arizona (UA)
and Northern Arizona University (NAU). CMS tested HOPE’s effects on a wide range of
colleges and universities in Georgia. This study focuses primarily on ASU, UA and NAU
as the scholarship applies to these institutions only. I also investigate the impact of AIMS
on other colleges and universities in Arizona as a falsification test, but I do not expect to
find a positive AIMS effect on enrollment at these other institutions because their students
are not eligible for the scholarship. There may, however, be a negative effect of AIMS on
enrollment at non-covered universities or colleges, as students might substitute away from
these institutions to attend ASU, UA, or NAU in order to take advantage of the scholarship.
In this study, I investigate the impact of the AIMS scholarship (the “AIMS Effect”) on
the number of student applications, number of students admitted, freshmen ACT scores,
first-year first-time enrollment (by race and gender), retention rates, and in-state tuition
and fees at ASU, UA and NAU. I find AIMS has an impact on both enrollment and tuition.
This result is robust when both difference-in-differences (DD) and synthetic control (SC)
empirical specifications are employed.
The remainder of Section 2.1 provides background information on the AIMS and HOPE
scholarships. Section 2.2 describes the empirical specification and data used in this analysis.
Section 2.3 presents the results in addition to a variety of robustness checks, including a syn-
thetic control model, placebo tests and asymptotically refined confidence intervals. Finally
Section 2.4 consists of conclusions and extensions for future research.
11
2.1.1 The AIMS Scholarship
Arizona students who graduated from high school in 2006 were the first class eligible for the
AIMS scholarship. In order to be eligible, students must meet the following requirements:
(a) they must complete all core high school classes with a grade of B or better, (b) they must
have a 3.5 GPA on a 4-point scale in core classes or rank in the top 5% of their class, and
(c) they must exceed standards on the three AIMS tests while in high school. Core courses
consist of classes such as English, math, and science.7 The AIMS tests measure student
competence in reading, writing, and math. Students who meet these requirements are eligible
for an in-state tuition scholarship that is valid for one year. This scholarship can be used at
one of Arizona’s three large public universities: Arizona State University (ASU), University
of Arizona (AU) and Northern Arizona University (NAU). Upon performing adequately in
college, the scholarship is renewable for a maximum of four years.8
Since the inception of the AIMS scholarship, the number of students who have taken
advantage of the scholarship has increased substantially. In 2006, about 1,500 incoming
college freshmen took advantage of AIMS. By 2009, this number increased to almost 3,000,
an increase of 88 percent. Due to this large increase in the cost of the program as well as
current budgetary constraints in Arizona, beginning with the high school graduating class
of 2013, the AIMS scholarship will only cover 25 percent of tuition.
The AIMS requirements contrast drastically with Georgia’s HOPE scholarship require-
ments. Georgia students who graduated from high school in 1993 were the first class eligible
for the HOPE scholarship. In order to be eligible, students need to graduate from an ac-
credited high school in Georgia with a 3.0 GPA or better. The requirements have remained
relatively constant over time.9 If met, students are eligible for an in-state tuition scholarship
7There are 16 “core competency” courses that include four units of English, four units of math, three
units of Science, two units of social sciences, two units of foreign language, and one unit of art.
8Arizona Department of Education 2012.
9Some changes have been made to the HOPE scholarship’s eligibility requirements. For example, in 1995,
the $100,000 parental income cap was removed. Other minor changes have been made over the years.
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that is valid for one year. Similar to AIMS, upon performing adequately in college, the
scholarship is renewable for a maximum of four years. Unlike AIMS, though, HOPE can be
used at any college or university in Georgia.
2.1.2 Data
I use data from the Integrated Post Secondary Education Data System (IPEDS) published
by the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) as the sole source of dependent vari-
ables. IPEDS has yearly data on over 7,400 colleges and universities throughout the United
States. Independent variables used in this paper include (a) first-year first-time enrollment
of freshman (by race and gender), (b) number of applicants, (c) student admissions, (d) ACT
scores of entering freshman10, (e) retention rates, and (f) in-state tuition and fees.11
Three control variables are employed. The first is the number of high school graduates
by state from the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES).12 It is hypothesized that
as the number of high school graduates increases in a state, so too will the enrollment at
that state’s colleges and universities. Previous research has shown that economic conditions
can affect many decisions made by students, such as whether to drop out of high school
(Rees and Mocan, 1997), whether to attend or continue college (Mincer, 1974; Dellas and
Sakellaris, 2003; Dellas and Koubi, 2003), and what major they should choose (Lee, 2010).13
Therefore, two additional variables are employed to control for labor market conditions.
These variables are the unemployment rate obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics’
Local Area Unemployment Statistics (LAUS) and the average weekly wage from Bureau of
10IPEDS does not provide average ACT scores, but instead provides the 25th and 75th percentile of ACT
scores of incoming freshmen. This paper utilizes the average of these two.
11Ideally, I would have limited the analysis to only in-state students, but due to data availability, this
is not possible. CMS were subject to the same data limitations, and therefore they also used all first-time
freshmen as the independent variable of interest.
12The estimated 18-24 year old population by state from the U.S. Census Bureau was also used, but because
these two variables are highly collinear, they were used interchangeably as a robustness check. The results
were robust to both variables, and therefore only regressions with high school graduates will be reported.
13Mincer discusses the human-capital investment-model which includes cyclic labor market conditions as
a potential reason to not obtain additional schooling.
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Labor Statistics’ Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW).14 Lovenheim and
Reynolds (2013) and Lovenheim (2011) test the impact of housing wealth on college choices
and found that increases in housing wealth can lead to an increase in college enrollment.
Therefore the state-level housing price index published by the Federal Housing Finance
Agency (FHFA) is also used as a covariate.15 The data set contains state-level information
on each of these variables from 2000 to 2010.
Table 2.1 presents the change in the variables of interest at the three universities analyzed
in this study (ASU, UA, and NAU) between 2005 (the year before AIMS was implemented)
and 2010 (the most recent year in the sample). First-year first-time enrollment of freshman
increased at all three universities over this time period, with NAU’s increase of 80 percent
being the most notable. ASU’s and UA’s enrollment increased by about 12 and 18 percent
respectively. While NAU experienced the largest percent increase in enrollment, it also has
the smallest first-year first-time enrollment both before and after the implementation of
AIMS.
Equally as noticeable as the change in enrollment is the change in tuition. Tuition
increased by over 74 percent at all three institutions, with the highest increase (84.6 percent)
at ASU. While these increases appear large, both tuition and enrollment are on an upward
trend nation-wide as previously discussed. Figure 2.1 presents a graphical representation of
the increase in both enrollment and in-state tuition and fees for the treatment and control
groups. The increase in enrollment of the treatment group compared to the control group is
particularly apparent after the implementation of AIMS in 2006.
14NAICS 23 Construction and NAICS 31-33 Manufacturing were also used to proxy for low skilled labor
that is potentially available for high school graduates. When these variables are used in the place of total
average weekly wages, the results are similar, and therefore regressions with the inclusion of these industry
specific variables are not included in the results
15Specifically, the average monthly seasonally adjusted housing price index by year is used.
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Table 2.1: Change in Enrollment and Tuition Over Time
2005 2010 % Change
Arizona State University (ASU)
Applicants 19,914 28,304 42.1%
Admissions 18,126 25,616 41.3%
Enrollment 7,396 8,261 11.7%
ACT Scores 23 23 0%
Retention 79% 81% 2.5%
Tuition + Fees $4,406 $8,132 84.6%
University of Arizona (UA)
Applicants 17,904 26,629 48.7%
Admissions 15,701 20,068 27.8%
Enrollment 5,785 6,804 17.6%
ACT Scores 23.5 24 2.1%
Retention 79% 78% -1.2%
Tuition + Fees $4,498 $8,237 83.1%
Northern Arizona University (NAU)
Applicants 7,305 31,773 349.9%
Admissions 6,308 20,024 217.4%
Enrollment 2,105 3,789 80.0%
ACT Scores 21 22.5 4.3%
Retention 69% 72% 7.1%
Tuition + Fees $4,393 $7,672 74.6%
Full-time first-time degree/certificate-seeking undergraduate students.
Retention rates for 2009 due to unavailability in 2010.
Table 2.2 presents the description of the variables as well as their summary statistics. All
of the universities in the sample are quite large, with an average of over 21,000 applicants
and 13,000 students admitted per year with incoming first-year first-time freshmen classes
averaging over 5,000 students per year and the average in-state student pays about $6,500
in tuition and fees each year. Retention rates are 85 percent on average.
15
Figure 2.1: Average First-Year First-Time Enrollment and In-State Tuition and Fees: Com-
parison of the Treatment and Control Groups
16
Table 2.2: Summary Statistics and Variable Descriptions
Variable Description Mean SD N
Total Applicants FTFY degree-seeking applicants total 21,508 9,055 170
Male Applicants FTFY degree-seeking applicants - Men 10,062 4,252 170
Female Applicants FTFY degree-seeking applicants - Women 11,444 4,913 170
Total Admissions FTFY degree-seeking admissions total 12,960 4,003 170
Male Admissions FTFY degree-seeking men admitted 5,899 1,940 170
Female Admissions FTFY degree-seeking women admitted 7,060 2,159 170
Enrollment Total FTFY degree-seeking enrolled full time total 5,162 1,540 170
Enrollment Men FTFY degree-seeking men enrolled full-time 2,421 785 170
Enrollment Women FTFY degree-seeking women enrolled full-time 2,740 798 170
ACT Total Average of ACT Composite 25th and 75th percentile score 24.7 2.1 138
ACT English Average of ACT English 25th and 75th percentile score 24.3 2.4 120
ACT Math Average of ACT Math 25th and 75th percentile score 24.8 2.5 120
Tuition Published in-state tuition and fees $6,533 $2,628 187
Retention Rate Full-time retention rate 85% 9.9% 115
Unemployment Rate Statewide-Not Seasonally Adjusted 6.1% 2.1% 170
High School Graduates Total High School Graduates 104,282 80,681 186
FHFA Index Federal Housing Finance Agency Housing Price Index 216.8 41.04 170
“FYFT” stands for “First-Year First-Time”
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2.2 Empirical Strategy
2.2.1 Difference-In-Differences (DD) Estimation
Following the empirical strategy employed by CMS to estimate the impact of HOPE on
educational outcomes in Georgia, I employ Equation (2.1) to estimate the impact of AIMS
on educational outcomes in Arizona. Control and treatment groups are identified, and the
following empirical specification is estimated:
ln(Eist) = α + δ(SAZ × At) +X ′stζ + γSis + βtYt + εist (2.1)
where Eist is the variable of interest at school i in state s in year t.16 SAZ is an indicator
variable corresponding to the treatment group: Arizona State University (ASU), University
of Arizona (UA), and Northern Arizona University (NAU) and is zero for the control schools.
At is an indicator variable that indicates the post-AIMS time period: 2006 to 2010. Xst is a
vector of control variables that includes the number of high school graduates, unemployment
rate, and average wage observed at the state level. Sis represents school fixed effects and Yt
is year fixed effects. The coefficient of interest is δ, as it represents the “AIMS effect.”
There are 14 institutions that both ASU and UA consider to be “peer institutions.” These
peer institutions are Florida State University, University of Illinois at Chicago, University
of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, University of Iowa, University of Maryland-College Park,
Michigan State University, University of Minnesota-Twin Cities, Rutgers University-New
Brunswick, Ohio State University, University of Texas at Austin, University of Washington-
Seattle Campus, and University of Wisconsin-Madison. These will be used as the control
group in the differences-in-differences framework.17
16Variables of interest include student enrollment, number of applicants, student admissions, ACT scores,
retention and tuition.
17NAU has a very different list of peer institutions due to its difference in size as compared to ASU and
UA as is illustrated in Table 2.1. Instead of trying to pick and choose which institutions are appropriate
peers for all three universities, I chose to use just the common peer institutions for ASU and UA. As a
18
Year and school level fixed effects are included in all regressions, although these coeffi-
cients are not reported. Standard errors are bootstrapped in all regressions.18
2.2.2 Synthetic Control (SC) Estimation
There have been substantial critiques to empirical literature that employs DD estimation
(Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan, 2004; Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller, 2010). Due
to critiques primarily about non-robustness to placebo tests especially when the number of
treated units is relatively small, researchers have been pushed to conduct additional robust-
ness checks to assure that results from DD estimation are indeed valid. One underlying
assumption necessary for DD estimation to be valid is that the treatment group would have
been the same as the control group holding all covariates constant post treatment had the
treatment not have been implemented. For this reason, choosing an appropriate control
group is crucial to validity of this estimation technique. Unfortunately choosing the “right”
control group is not always a straightforward or easy process. This is illustrated in this
paper, as two of the three universities being analyzed are very similar (ASU and UA) but
the third school (NAU) is less similar. Therefore, the use of SC methods are particularly
relevant in this application.
Before creating the synthetic schools, the potential group of control schools is expanded
to include all four-year public universities in the IPEDS southwest region in addition to the
control schools discussed in section 2.2.1.19 This increases the potential control group from
robustness check, I ran separate regressions using each school as the sole treatment school. These results of
this specification are presented in Table 2.6 and are discussed further in the results section. Furthermore,
similarly ranked institutions in the U.S. News and World Report College Rankings were also considered as
a potential control group. In 2006, the year when AIMS was implemented, only one of the three schools,
University of Arizona, received a ranking and therefore I chose to use the common peers as the control group.
18Cluster corrections are not used in calculating the standard errors because the number of schools is not
sufficiently large compared to the number of years (17 schools over 10 years). When standard errors are
clustered at the institution level, the results do not differ significantly. Not clustering is the more conservative
approach, and therefore these more conservative standard errors are reported.
19The IPEDS southwest region includes Arizona New Mexico, Oklahoma and Texas. No other schools
within Arizona are included in the expanded control group as they were potentially impacted by AIMS.
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thirteen schools to thirty-two schools. Using this expanded group of potential controls, I
create a synthetic control school for ASU, UA and NAU using the methods discussed in
Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller (2010). Then, removing ASU, UA and NAU from the
sample, I create synthetic schools for each of the other institutions that will be used to
conduct a placebo test.
Following Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller (2010) synthetic control groups are made
by choosing aW ∗ that minimizes
√
(X1 −X0W )′V (X1 −X0W ) where X0 is a vector of pre-
intervention characteristics for the exposed regions (or treatment group) and X1 is a vector
of pre-intervention characteristics of the non-exposed regions (or control group). W is a
(J×1) vector or positive weights that sum to one. V is some (k×k) symmetric and positive
semidefinite matrix. The “synthetic schools” are created by taking a weighted average of
the other schools variable of interest. The weights used come from W which was estimated
econometrically.
A “synthetic school” is made to correspond with each school in the sample (both control
and treatment schools) for purposes of analyzing changes in enrollment by constructing X0
and X1 to include the following variables: enrollment, applicants, number of high school
graduates, unemployment rate, total wages, and FHFA HPI.20 A second “synthetic school” is
made to correspond with each school in the sample for purposes of analyzing changes in tu-
ition using the following variables: tuition, enrollment, high school graduates, unemployment
rate, total wages, and FHFA HPI.21
Table 2.3 shows the weights associated with potential control institutions to make up
the “synthetic school” for ASU, UA, and NAU for both enrollment and tuition. As can
be expected, the weighting vector used to create the synthetic schools for ASU and UA
enrollment are very similar, thus speaking to the validity of using the same control group
in the DD estimation. As is also expected, the synthetic control school for NAU is quite
different, thus reaffirming the need for conducting SC estimation. Importantly, the SC
20The natural log of each one of these variables is used in order to be consistent with regression results.
21The natural log of these variables is also used in order to be consistent with regression results.
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methods are consistent with colloquial knowledge of these institutions. Table 2.3 also shows
that the synthetic control group used for estimating the AIMS effect on tuition is almost
identical for these three schools. This is expected, as the same board of regents approves
tuition increases for all three of these schools, and therefore the tuition increases at these
three institutions is very consistent across the different institutions.
Table 2.3: Synthetic Control Group Weights
ASU UA NAU
Enrollment
Florida State University 57.1% 57.2% -
Michigan State University 26.3% 30.3% -
University of Minnesota-Twin Cities 11.2% 8.2% 21.1%
University of New Mexico-Main Campus 4.2% - -
University of Washington-Seattle Campus - - 21.8%
University of Wisconsin Colleges - - 47.4%
Tuition
Michigan State University 16.5% 16.5% 16.5%
University of Minnesota-Twin Cities 32.9% 32.9% 32.8%
University of New Mexico-Main Campus 10%% 10.1% 10.1%
New Mexico State University-Main Campus 10%% 10% 10.1%
University of Wisconsin Colleges 30.5%% 30.5% 30.5%
2.3 Results
Table 2.4 presents the estimated impact of AIMS on applicants at ASU, UA, and NAU.
The estimated AIMS effect on applicants is quite large, about 20 percent for both men and
women, although it is not statistically significantly different than zero. This increase can
also be seen graphically in Figure 2.2, which shows an increase in the average number of
applicants in the treatment group compared to the control group after the implementation
of AIMS in 2006. While the estimated impact is large, results are not statistically significant.
This result can be explained if students “cast a wide net” when applying for colleges, and
therefore apply in either the presence or absence of AIMS.
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Table 2.4: Estimated AIMS Effect on Applicants and Admissions
Applicants Admissions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Total Men Women Total Total Men Men Women Women
AIMS Effect 0.202 0.207 0.196 0.128 -0.0356 0.134 -0.0330 0.123 -0.0361
(0.197) (0.200) (0.199) (0.101) (0.134) (0.0978) (0.104) (0.0936) (0.130)
Total 0.800∗∗∗
(0.252)
Men 0.801∗∗∗
(0.224)
Women 0.799∗∗∗
(0.204)
Ln(H.S. Grad) -0.216 -0.202 -0.227 0.195 0.367 0.194 0.355 0.190 0.371
(0.409) (0.390) (0.398) (0.296) (0.361) (0.297) (0.320) (0.341) (0.312)
Ln(Unemp) -0.00871 -0.00418 -0.0136
(0.197) (0.183) (0.235)
Ln(Total Wages) 2.075∗ 1.828∗ 2.302∗
(1.087) (0.991) (1.246)
Ln(FHFA HPI Index) -0.332 -0.313 -0.354
(0.218) (0.198) (0.252)
Observations 169 169 169 169 169 169 169 169 169
Bootstrapped standard errors are reported in parentheses. School and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Treatment
Group includes UA, ASU and NAU. Control Group includes peer institutions.
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Figure 2.2: Average Number of Applicants and Student Admissions: Comparison of the
Treatment and Control Groups
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Table 2.4 presents the findings on the number of students who are admitted each year
to ASU, UA, and NAU. These results serve two purposes. First, this tests whether more
students were admitted after the implementation of AIMS. Secondly, it provides insight to
whether the schools themselves changed their admissions policies due to the scholarship.
As seen in Table 2.4, when the number of applicants is not controlled for, the estimated
magnitude of the AIMS effect on student admissions is quite large, about 12 to 13 percent
(although not statistically significant), but when the number of applicants is controlled for,
the estimated AIMS effect attenuates and actually becomes slightly negative, but is still
statistically insignificant. Figure 2.2 illustrates this increase in admissions in the treatment
group compared to the control group at these universities after 2006. Again, though, due
to the statistical insignificance of this effect, I do not have sufficient evidence to conclude
that more students were admitted due to the scholarship. Equally as important, I find no
evidence that the schools have changed their admittance decisions due to the scholarship, as
the number of students admitted, holding applicants constant, also did not change.
Table 2.5 presents the estimated enrollment effects and shows a statistically significant
overall AIMS effect as well as an impact for both men and women separately. A 15 percent in-
crease in overall first-year first-time enrollment–hereafter simply referred to as “enrollment”–is
estimated using this framework. The AIMS effect is estimated to be higher for women than
for men, about 16-17 percent for women as compared to 14 percent for men. These results
are robust when the unemployment rate, wages, and housing prices are used as covariates.
I find no impact of either the unemployment rate or average weekly wages on enrollment.
Because no AIMS effect was observed on either applicants or admissions, this increase in
enrollment is most likely attributable to students’ choices of where to attend college.
At first glance, this estimated increase in enrollment appears large compared to CMS who
estimated a 5.9 percent increase in Georgia enrollment due to the HOPE scholarship. But
upon further consideration, it is not at all surprising as the HOPE scholarship is available
to students who attend any public college or university in Georgia, while AIMS is only
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Table 2.5: Estimated AIMS Effect on Enrollment of First-Year First-Time Degree Seeking
Freshmen
All Men Women
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
AIMS Effect 0.150∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗ 0.165∗∗∗ 0.170∗∗∗
(0.0422) (0.0410) (0.0469) (0.0465) (0.0490) (0.0519)
Ln(H.S. Grad) 0.120 0.126 0.148 0.162 0.0916 0.0902
(0.109) (0.103) (0.153) (0.143) (0.118) (0.142)
Ln(Unemp) -0.0242 -0.0635 0.00997
(0.137) (0.202) (0.0593)
Ln(Total Wages) 0.571 0.334 0.767∗
(0.447) (0.478) (0.426)
Ln(FHFA HPI Index) -0.137 -0.0888 -0.190∗∗∗
(0.0914) (0.152) (0.0638)
Observations 169 169 169 169 169 169
R2 0.391 0.407 0.413 0.417 0.299 0.337
Bootstrapped standard errors are reported in parentheses. School and year fixed effects are included
in all regressions. Treatment Group includes UA, ASU and NAU. Control Group includes peer insti-
tutions.
available to three in-state institutions. Therefore, it is not surprising that these institutions
see a relatively large percentage increase in enrollment compared to the overall percentage
increase that all colleges and universities in Georgia received.
Next, Table 2.6 presents estimates of the AIMS effect on enrollment for each university
separately. The enrollment effects for ASU and UA are roughly the same, between 10 and
11 percent. The enrollment effect for NAU is much larger: about 24-25 percent. While the
percent increase in enrollment for NAU is much larger, NAU is a much smaller school and
therefore the actual increase in the number of students is not necessarily larger. For instance,
in 2005, the year before AIMS was implemented, NAU enrolled 2,105 students, while ASU
and UA enrolled 7,396 and 5,785 students respectively. Therefore, while the percent increases
for NAU is larger, the actual magnitude of the increase in number of students is similar. This
estimated increase in the number of students enrolled is discussed in detail in Section 2.3.2.
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Table 2.6: Estimated AIMS Effect on the number of First Year First Time Degree Seeking
Freshmen By School
ASU UA NAU
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
AIMS Effect 0.113∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗ 0.246∗∗∗ 0.247∗∗∗
(0.0260) (0.0364) (0.0222) (0.0257) (0.0206) (0.0289)
Ln(H.S. Grad) 0.118 0.135 0.0175 0.0424 0.0756 0.0955
(0.156) (0.200) (0.126) (0.124) (0.110) (0.175)
Ln(Unemp) -0.0224 -0.0519 -0.0131
(0.0870) (0.131) (0.131)
Ln(Total Wages) 0.471 0.309 0.569
(0.480) (0.556) (0.432)
Ln(FHFA HPI Index) -0.0810 -0.0727 -0.144
(0.0765) (0.110) (0.0908)
Observations 149 149 149 149 149 149
R2 0.281 0.292 0.284 0.292 0.374 0.394
Bootstrapped standard errors are reported in parentheses. School and year fixed effects are included
in all regressions. Treatment Group includes UA, ASU and NAU. Control Group includes peer insti-
tutions.
As presented in Table 2.1, ASU experienced an 11.7 percent increase in enrollment from
2005 to 2010, and Table 2.6 presents the estimated AIMS effect on enrollment at ASU to be
approximately 11 percent. UA and NAU, on the other hand, experienced an approximately
18 and 80 percent increase in enrollment respectively over this same time period, but the
estimated impact of AIMS on enrollment is about 11 and 25 percent respectively. According
to these results, almost all of the increase in enrollment seen at ASU after the implemen-
tation of AIMS can be attributed to the AIMS scholarship, while only 61 and 31 percent
respectively of the increases in enrollment at UA and NAU can be associated with AIMS.
Less formally, enrollment would have increased at UA and NAU regardless of whether AIMS
was implemented, but enrollment increased more than it otherwise would have due to the
implementation of AIMS.
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Table 2.7 presents a statistically significant impact of AIMS on enrollment for white
students: approximately a 6 to 8 percent increase. The estimated AIMS effect is larger for
women than for men and the estimated enrollment effect is not statistically significant for
men. It should also be noted that the estimated AIMS effect on white students is significantly
lower than the overall AIMS effect presented in Table 2.5. This indicates that the AIMS effect
is likely larger for minorities. This result is consistent with CMS’s findings on the impact
of HOPE on enrollment in Georgia. Table 2.7 presents coefficient estimates for enrollment
effects on black students. These point estimates are much larger than the estimated AIMS
effect for white students. Overall AIMS has increased enrollment of black students by about
25 percent. The estimated AIMS effect on enrollment for black men is 32 percent–higher
than for any other group. While the AIMS effect was estimated to be slightly larger for
white women than for white men, the converse is observed with black women and men as
the AIMS effect for black men is about 13 percentage points larger than for black women.
Table 2.7 shows the estimated AIMS effect on Hispanic enrollment. These point esti-
mates are on average larger than the overall estimated AIMS effects, but not as large in
magnitude as the coefficients estimating black enrollment effects. Specifically, a 21 to 23
percent enrollment effect is estimated. The estimated effect is similar for Hispanic men and
women. Again these results are robust to the inclusion of covariates that control for eco-
nomic conditions.22 Consistent with results on the Georgia HOPE scholarship, the AIMS
scholarship has a larger impact on minority enrollment than white student enrollment. This
result is intuitive, as minority students, on average, might be subject to budget constraints
to a larger extent than their white counterparts, and therefore a scholarship program can be
more effective at increasing enrollment.
22Results for the AIMS effect on American Indian and Asian student enrollment is also available upon
request. These results are not statistically significant and therefore regression tables are not included.
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Table 2.7: Estimated AIMS Effect on Enrollment by Race
White Black Hispanic
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
All Men Women All Men Women All Men Women
AIMS Effect 0.0710∗∗∗ 0.0586∗ 0.0867∗∗ 0.250∗∗ 0.321∗∗ 0.193∗∗ 0.211∗∗∗ 0.211∗∗∗ 0.211∗∗∗
(0.0251) (0.0336) (0.0387) (0.106) (0.141) (0.0888) (0.0300) (0.0608) (0.0358)
Ln(Unemp) -0.100 -0.0431 -0.162 -0.396 -0.146 -0.593∗∗ -0.317∗∗ -0.214 -0.411∗∗
(0.167) (0.160) (0.183) (0.247) (0.168) (0.258) (0.128) (0.224) (0.185)
Ln(Total Wages) -0.345 -0.552 -0.153 2.138 1.406 2.576 0.952 1.200 0.814
(0.519) (0.473) (0.579) (1.859) (2.013) (1.884) (1.355) (1.774) (1.245)
Ln(FHFA HPI Index) -0.0484 0.0792 -0.179 -0.420 -0.224 -0.565 -0.0373 0.0325 -0.103
(0.148) (0.140) (0.176) (0.368) (0.359) (0.387) (0.138) (0.172) (0.165)
Observations 143 143 143 143 143 143 143 143 143
R2 0.051 0.093 0.098 0.249 0.229 0.245 0.653 0.609 0.562
Bootstrapped standard errors are reported in parentheses. School and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Treatment
Group includes UA, ASU and NAU. Control Group includes peer institutions.
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The AIMS scholarship can only be used at one of the three schools being analyzed in the
previous regressions: ASU, UA, and NAU. For this reason, it is not surprising that AIMS
had an impact on enrollment at these schools, but it is unknown what these new enrollees
would have done had they not attended one of these three universities. First, these students
may not have attended college at all if AIMS was not available. Because AIMS has very
stringent requirements (a 3.5 high school GPA as well as a passing score on three exams)
it seems unlikely that these students would not attend college in the absence of AIMS. A
second possibility is that these students are substituting away from other schools in Arizona
to attend ASU, UA, or NAU due to the scholarship. Third, the students may substitute
away from out-of-state colleges and universities and instead choose to stay in-state. I explore
these three possibilities.
First, I test whether students are substituting away from other in-state schools to attend
ASU, UA, and NAU. Table 2.8 presents the estimated enrollment effects of AIMS at other
colleges and universities in Arizona. Specifically, in these regressions the treatment group
contains all Arizona schools except ASU, UA and, NAU, while the control group contains
all schools in in New Mexico, Texas, and Oklahoma. I estimate separate regressions for (a)
all colleges and universities in Arizona, (b) all four-year (public and private) colleges and
universities, as well as (c) two-year institutions. The results presented in Table 2.8 serve
two purposes. First, they test to see if AIMS had a negative impact on enrollment at other
institutions in the state. If a negative relationship is found, then it provides evidence that
students are substituting away from other schools in Arizona. It also serves as a falsification
test for previous results. Because AIMS is not available to students who attend these other
in-state schools, if a positive significant AIMS effect on enrollment is found, this will be
a warning that previous results are potentially problematic. As can be seen in Table 2.8,
no AIMS effect is observed on enrollment at any institution and therefore the substitution
hypothesis is not supported.23
23Separate analysis was conducted analyzing the impact of the AIMS scholarship on Maricopa Community
College system’s enrollment. Maricopa Community College has seven separate schools located near Phoenix
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Table 2.8: Enrollment Effects of AIMS at Arizona Colleges and Universities
All 4-Year 2-Year
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
AIMS Effect 0.145 0.0804 0.189 0.122 0.248 0.136
(0.218) (0.186) (0.216) (0.187) (0.200) (0.193)
Ln(H.S. Grad) 0.404 0.280 0.408 0.139 0.325 0.156
(0.302) (0.361) (0.345) (0.367) (0.483) (0.410)
Ln(Unemp) 0.275 0.260 0.503
(0.237) (0.243) (0.380)
Ln(Total Wages) -1.023 -2.005 -1.356
(1.385) (1.423) (2.833)
Ln(FHFA HPI Index) 0.284 0.341 0.460
(0.300) (0.297) (0.401)
Observations 1010 1010 890 890 540 540
R2 0.028 0.030 0.053 0.057 0.053 0.057
Bootstrapped standard errors are reported. School and year fixed effects are included in all
regressions. Treatment group includes colleges and universities in Arizona. Control group
includes collegs and universities in NM, TX, and OK. ASU, UA, and NAU are not included
in any of these regressions.
Due to the lack of evidence that students are substituting away from other colleges and
universities in Arizona to attend either ASU, UA, or NAU, I explore the other two possible
explanations for these new students. First, these new students may otherwise not attend
college if AIMS were not available. Second, students might attend schools out of state if
not for AIMS. While I cannot directly test which of these effects dominates, I can test
whether the quality of students at ASU, UA and NAU changed due to the AIMS scholarship
using two different measures: incoming freshmen American College Testing (ACT) scores
and retention rates. Students who are on the margin of whether to attend college may have
lower credentials (such as ACT scores) upon entering college and will potentially be more
Arizona. I find no impact of AIMS on these colleges, and therefore I find no evidence to support the
hypothesis that students are substituting away from these local community colleges to attend ASU, UA or
NAU. These results are available upon request.
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likely to drop out. If the quality of students does not change or increases due to AIMS, then
it is unlikely that these new students were on the margin of whether to attend college.
Table 2.9 tests for the impact of AIMS on ACT scores.24 I find a decrease in composite
ACT test scores by less than 1 point (.768 points). While this result is statistically significant,
it is not economically significant, as the ACT has a maximum score of 36 points, with a mean
of 18 and standard deviation of 6. Therefore, I estimate a decrease of less than 15 percent
of one standard deviation. Furthermore, when separate regressions are run on English or
math scores, no statistically significant impact is found. Therefore, the quality of incoming
freshmen as measured by ACT scores has not declined. One potential explanation for the
very slight drop in ACT scores might have to do with the AIMS scholarship itself. Because
AIMS does not require that students perform well on the ACT, but rather on the three
AIMS exams in high school, students may substitute studying away from the ACT toward
the AIMS exams. This result contrasts with CMS, who found that HOPE led to an increase
in SAT scores.25
Table 2.9 also tests for quality of student by estimating AIMS’ impact on retention rates.
Retention rates are the proportion of students enrolled in one semester that are still enrolled
the next semester, excluding students who graduate. These regressions estimate that AIMS
increased retention rates by less than 2 percent, but these are not statistically significant at
any level.26 Therefore, there is no evidence to conclude that AIMS had a negative impact on
retention rates at ASU, UA and NAU. These results are robust when economic conditions are
controlled for. Because I find no evidence that the quality of students at these universities
decreased after the implementation of AIMS and no evidence that students are substituting
24University of Maryland –College Park and University of Connecticut are excluded from these regressions
as applicants at these schools primarily take the SAT, unlike the other schools in the sample who are primarily
interested in ACT scores.
25The SAT test is similar to the ACT test in that it is a standardized test that is taken before applying
to college. SAT was previously an acronym for “Scholastic Assessment Test” but is now an empty acronym.
26It should be noted that data is not available on retention rates of just first year students, therefore this
is not a perfect measure of retention of students exposed to AIMS.
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away from other in-state colleges, the most likely explanation is that students are substituting
away from out of state colleges to stay in Arizona.27
Table 2.9: Estimated AIMS Effect on ACT Scores and Retention Rates
ACT Scores Retention
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Composite English Math
AIMS Effect -0.700∗∗ -0.315 -0.433 0.194
(0.342) (0.408) (0.529) (0.438)
Ln(Unemp) 0.0736 0.328 0.995 -0.885
(0.351) (0.574) (0.628) (1.179)
Ln(Total Wages) 2.784 4.310 8.238∗ -15.99
(4.451) (5.157) (4.905) (12.42)
Ln(FHFA HPI Index) -0.376 -0.220 0.0920 0.191
(0.485) (0.691) (0.694) (1.369)
Observations 132 120 120 115
R2 0.584 0.578 0.602 0.424
Bootstrapped standard errors are reported in parentheses. School and year
fixed effects are included in all regressions. Treatment Group includes UA,
ASU and NAU. Control Group includes peer institutions.
Finally, Table 2.10 presents estimates of the AIMS effect on in-state tuition and fees. I
find a statistically significant and large impact of a 16 to 20 percent increase in tuition and
fees due to the AIMS scholarship. Table 2.1 shows a much larger change in tuition from 2005
to 2010–approximately a 75 to 85 percent increase. These results suggest that there would
have been an increase in tuition regardless of whether AIMS was implemented. However,
tuition increased more than it otherwise would have due to AIMS. This result is intuitive.
Because some students’ education is subsidized, the price sensitivity is reduced. Therefore,
universities have greater liberty to increase tuition without compromising enrollment.
Next, the main result of the paper is replicated using SC methods. In particular, the
overall AIMS effect on enrollment and tuition is estimated. The difference between the
27Retention rates are for all students, not just students who drop out after their first year. For this reason,
this is an imperfect measure of retention rates of the impacted students.
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Table 2.10: Estimated AIMS Effect on In State Tuition and Fees
ASU UA NAU
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
AIMS Effect 0.192∗∗∗ 0.187∗∗∗ 0.190∗∗∗ 0.185∗∗∗ 0.165∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗
(0.0245) (0.0251) (0.0202) (0.0297) (0.0214) (0.0325)
Ln(H.S. Grad) 0.179 0.181 0.196
(0.130) (0.120) (0.146)
Ln(Unemp) -0.180 -0.183∗ -0.184
(0.114) (0.111) (0.116)
Ln(Total Wages) 1.940∗∗∗ 1.937∗ 1.910∗∗
(0.581) (1.018) (0.916)
Ln(FHFA HPI Index) -0.553∗∗∗ -0.552∗∗∗ -0.546∗∗∗
(0.138) (0.120) (0.112)
Observations 150 149 150 149 150 149
R2 0.917 0.940 0.917 0.939 0.918 0.941
Bootstrapped standard errors are reported in parentheses. School and year fixed effects are included in
all regressions. Treatment Group includes UA, ASU and NAU. Control Group includes peer institutions.
synthetic schools’ enrollment and actual enrollment as well as the difference between the
synthetic schools’ tuition and actual tuition is presented in Figure 2.3. As can be seen, the
difference between the treated schools and their respective synthetic schools increased after
AIMS was implemented. Furthermore, the difference between the other controls and their
synthetic schools did not change before and after the treatment.
Figure 2.4 illustrates these results further by showing a histogram of the estimated treat-
ment effect using only each school and its synthetic control. Equations 2.2 and 2.3 illustrate
the DD estimation used to estimate the AIMS effect on enrollment and tuition where there
is only one treatment school and one control school (the synthetic control). Each school in
the sample is “treated” and compared to its synthetic school. If the previous results in this
paper are robust, then δ will be approximately zero for the non-Arizona schools and δ will
be similar to the point estimates presented in Tables 2.6 and 2.10 for the Arizona schools.
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Figure 2.3: Enrollment and Tuition Gaps at Arizona Schools and Placebo Gaps in Non-
Arizona Schools.
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Figure 2.4: Histograms of estimated treatment effects for Arizona schools and non-Arizona
placebo schools.
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ln(Eist) = α + δ(ST × At) + γSis + βtYt + εist (2.2)
ln(Tist) = α + δ(ST × At) + γSis + βtYt + εist (2.3)
The estimated AIMS Effect on Enrollment for ASU, UA and NAU using this synthetic
control group is 16.8%, 14.9% and 26.83% respectively. Note that these estimates are actually
slightly larger than the results presented in Table 2.6, thus giving evidence that if anything,
DD results are downward biased. The estimated AIMS effect on tuition and fees using the
SC group for ASU, UA and NAU are 21.2%, 20.9% and 18.5% respectively. These results
are similar to the estimated AIMS effect of 16-19.5% presented in Table 2.10. A comparison
of the results from the DD and SC methods are presented in Table 2.11.
Table 2.11: Comparison of DD and SC Results
DD SC Observed ∆
Enrollment
ASU 11.1% 15.7% 11.7%
UA 10.8% 13.7% 17.6%
NAU 24.6% 26.9% 80%
Tuition + Fees
ASU 18.7% 22.5% 84.6%
UA 18.5% 22.3% 83.1%
NAU 15.8% 19.8% 74.6%
Next, I implement a placebo test by estimating the AIMS effect for every other school in
the sample relative to its synthetic school. Figure 2.4 illustrates that the estimated AIMS
effect on both enrollment and tuition are large compared to the estimated effects for the
other schools that were used as a placebo test. In fact, all of the other schools’ estimated
AIMS effects are centered around zero. The estimated AIMS effects on tuition for ASU, UA
and NAU are three of the top four and the estimated AIMS effect on tuition of ASU, UA
and NUA are the three highest. This speaks to the robustness of these results.
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2.3.1 Additional Robustness Checks
There have been substantial critiques to difference-in-differences estimation (Bertrand, Du-
flo, and Mullainathan, 2004; Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller, 2010). Due to critiques
primarily about potential overestimation of standard errors, non-robustness to placebo tests,
and improper controls, researchers have been pushed to conduct additional robustness checks
to assure that results from difference-in-differences estimation are indeed valid. These cri-
tiques are especially important when there is relatively small number of units being observed,
N , relative to the number of time periods, T , which is certainly the case in this research. For
these reasons, I have conducted additional robustness checks that together illustrate that it
is very unlikely that the results in this paper are due to misspecification of standard errors,
serial correlation, or an inappropriate control group.
One well-know problem with difference-in-differences estimation is the potential down-
ward bias in the standard errors (Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan, 2004). This can be
especially true if the number of groups, N , is not sufficiently large compared to the number of
time periods, T . In order to account for this potential issue, all standard errors presented in
the previous results have been bootstrapped.28 While bootstrapping does mitigate concerns
about the large-N -small-T problem, it does not improve estimation in small samples.
In order to mitigate concerns about the validity of confidence intervals due to the small
number of observations used in this research, I calculate asymptotically refined confidence
intervals that are then compared the bootstrapped standard errors for the main specification.
The advantage to using such asymptotically refined confidence intervals is that they obtain
an approximation error that disappears at a rate faster than the standard t-test statistic
used to test statistical significance with the standard errors obtained through bootstrapping
28When the same regressions are run with standard errors clustered at the institution level, results are
similar. Bootstrapped standard errors are the most conservative, as cluster corrections are are only asymp-
totically valid when the number of groups in the panel data context is sufficiently large, which is certainly
not the case in this application.
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(Cameron and Trivedi, 2009). These asymptotically refined critical values will produce a
more conservative estimate than the standard t-distribution.
I calculate asymptotically refined critical values for the main results of this paper which
are presented in Tables 2.5 through 2.10. For example, asymptotically refined critical values
for regression 1 in Table 2.5 are 2.35, 2.93, and 4.18 (p=.10, p=.05 and p=.01 respectively).
The test static had a value of 3.47 for this regression, and thus statistical significance de-
creases from significant at p=.01 to p=.05. While the level of statistical significance changes
in some regressions in Tables 2.5 and 2.10, the overall statistical significance of the result does
not. Thus, using conservative bootrapped standard errors as well as conservative asymptot-
ically refined confidence intervals does not change the main result.29
Another well-known problem with difference-in-differences estimation is the fact that it
has not been found to be robust to serial correlation in many applications. For instance,
Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) finds that serial correlation is a potential problem
in a survey of papers using difference-in-differences estimation due to the relatively large
number of time periods, as the average in their sample of papers is 16.5 periods. Further-
more, the most commonly used dependent variables in the surveyed papers are shown to
be highly serially correlated. In response to this well known critique, the next robustness
check employed controls for serial correlation that can potentially cause bias in estimating
the impact of the AIMS scholarship on enrollment.
Two tests are conducted in order to control for potential bias in the estimation due to
serial correlation. First, lags of the two main dependent variables in this paper–enrollment
and tuition and fees–are used. These results are presented in Tables 2.12 and 2.13. The
estimated coefficient for the AIMS effect on enrollment remains virtually unchanged when
one lag of the dependent variable is included. When two and three lags are included, the
coefficient attenuates from about 15 percent to about 12 percent, but the results remains
statistically significant even when covariates are used. The impact of lagged dependent
29Please contact me for complete asymptotically refined confidence intervals.
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variables attenuates results more significantly for tuition and fees. The estimated AIMS
effect on tuition and fees declines from 17 percent to about 7 percent when lagged dependent
variables are employed.
In order to estimate the AIMS effect adjusting for serial correlation, the Arellano-Bond
(AB) estimator (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Windmeijer, 2005) is also employed using one,
two, and three lags. These results are presented in Tables 2.12 and 2.13. The AB estimator
is used as OLS when lagged dependent variables and serial correlated errors can lead to
inconsistent parameter estimates. This additional robustness check will add one more level of
stringency. When the AB estimator is employed using one lag, the AIMS effect on enrollment
is still statistically significant at p=.05, but the magnitude decreases from about 15 percent
(when this estimator is not employed) to 11 percent. The result is similar when two lags are
employed. When the third lag is employed, the statistical significance attenuates completely
and the estimated AIMS effect attenuates to 7 percent. The estimated AIMS effect on
tuition and fees also decreases substantially when the AB estimator is used–from 17 percent
to about 5 percent when one lag is used and 3 percent when two and three lags are employed.
2.3.2 Percent of Scholarship Dollars Spent on Marginal Students
I have shown that AIMS has led to an increase in first-year first-time freshmen enrollment
at ASU, UA, and NAU. In this section, I consider the following question: What percent
of the scholarship recipients would not have attended one of the three treatment schools if
they were not eligible for AIMS? Conversely, what percent of the students who receive AIMS
would attend one of these three schools even if they were not eligible for AIMS (i.e., their
college decision is not altered by the scholarship)? I consider the following:
Eai = (1 + δˆi,1)E
c
i (2.4)
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Table 2.12: Estimated AIMS Effect on First-Year First-Time Enrollment Robustness Checks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
No Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag AB 1 Lag AB 2 Lag AB 3 Lag
AIMS Effect 0.152∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗ 0.114 0.105 0.0731
(0.0334) (0.0317) (0.0345) (0.0364) (0.0778) (0.0754) (0.0666)
Ln(Unemp) -0.0242 -0.110 -0.159∗ -0.132 -0.156 -0.120 -0.133
(0.0795) (0.0818) (0.0906) (0.0989) (0.137) (0.159) (0.190)
Ln(Total Wages) 0.571 0.375 0.706 0.693 1.654∗∗ 1.433∗∗∗ 1.390∗∗∗
(0.476) (0.453) (0.484) (0.579) (0.710) (0.519) (0.514)
Ln(FHFA HPI Index) -0.137 -0.102 -0.176∗ -0.164 -0.139 -0.127 -0.125
(0.0831) (0.0865) (0.0946) (0.113) (0.0905) (0.0999) (0.132)
Ln(Total Enrollment)t−1 0.198∗∗ 0.344∗∗∗ 0.285∗∗∗ 0.410∗∗∗ 0.439∗∗∗ 0.365∗∗∗
(0.0790) (0.0941) (0.103) (0.154) (0.145) (0.129)
Ln(Total Enrollment)t−2 -0.00759 0.155 0.0396 0.220∗∗
(0.0816) (0.103) (0.0596) (0.112)
Ln(Total Enrollment)t−3 -0.108 -0.0307
(0.0941) (0.0384)
Observations 169 152 135 119 134 118 102
R2 0.407 0.521 0.536 0.518
Arellano-Bond (AB) estimation used in regressions 5-7.
Robust standard errors are reported. School and year fixed effects are included in all regressions.
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Table 2.13: Estimated AIMS Effect on Full Time Tuition and Fees Robustness Checks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
No Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag AB 1 Lag AB 2 Lag AB 3 Lag
AIMS Effect 0.169∗∗∗ 0.0717∗∗ 0.0606∗∗ 0.0707∗∗∗ 0.0468∗ 0.0325 0.0315∗∗
(0.0323) (0.0284) (0.0268) (0.0244) (0.0261) (0.0213) (0.0158)
Ln(Unemp) -0.203∗∗∗ -0.0964 -0.0344 0.0635 -0.102 -0.0464 0.0272
(0.0768) (0.0727) (0.0682) (0.0640) (0.0860) (0.0483) (0.0681)
Ln(Total Wages) 2.113∗∗∗ 1.566∗∗∗ 1.384∗∗∗ 1.384∗∗∗ 1.927∗∗∗ 1.471∗∗∗ 1.636∗∗∗
(0.460) (0.401) (0.367) (0.346) (0.566) (0.340) (0.572)
Ln(FHFA HPI Index) -0.582∗∗∗ -0.388∗∗∗ -0.400∗∗∗ -0.280∗∗∗ -0.392∗∗∗ -0.427∗∗∗ -0.311∗∗∗
(0.0803) (0.0788) (0.0707) (0.0687) (0.0891) (0.0584) (0.0902)
Ln(Tuition and Fees)t−1 0.601∗∗∗ 0.748∗∗∗ 0.809∗∗∗ 0.654∗∗∗ 0.717∗∗∗ 0.642∗∗∗
(0.0719) (0.0877) (0.0818) (0.119) (0.0929) (0.135)
Ln(Tuition and Fees)t−2 -0.189∗∗ -0.141 -0.112 -0.0667
(0.0903) (0.0942) (0.0878) (0.115)
Ln(Tuition and Fees)t−3 -0.0576 -0.0174
(0.0813) (0.0944)
Observations 169 152 135 119 134 118 102
R2 0.945 0.954 0.954 0.959
Arellano-Bond (AB) estimation used in regressions 5-7.
Bootstrapped standard errors are reported. School and year fixed effects are included in all regressions.
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Where Eai is the actual number of students who were enrolled in school i in 2010 and Eci
is the “counterfactual” number of students school i, or the number of students who would be
enrolled if AIMS were not implemented. Solving for Eai − Eci , I get the following
Eai − Eci = Eai
( δˆi,1
1 + δˆi,1
)
(2.5)
This equation provides the estimated difference in the number of students who actually
attended one of the treatment schools that would not have attended if AIMS were not
available. Table 2.1 shows the actual 2010 enrollment at each of these three schools. Table
2.6 shows two estimates of δˆi,1 for each school. For these calculations, I used the estimated
coefficients in regressions (2), (4), and (6) as they include the full list of covariates. Using
these inputs in Equation 2.5, I find that enrollment increased by 825, 663, and 748 students
at ASU, UA, and NAU respectively.30
These are the estimated number of students who attended ASU, UA and NAU that
would not have otherwise done so without AIMS. I do not know the number of students who
actually received the scholarship at each of these schools, but I do know that 2,935 students
in total utilized the scholarship in 2009.31 Summing the additional students from (4)-(6)
yields 2,217 students. Therefore, I estimate that 718 of the 2,935 students, or 24 percent,
who received the scholarship in 2009 would have attended one of these schools regardless of
whether they were eligible for AIMS. Therefore, conversely, 76 percent of the students who
received the AIMS scholarship would not have attended ASU, UA, or NAU if the scholarship
was not available. They would have (a) not attended college at all (b) attended a school out
of Arizona or (c) attended another school in state. I am unable to empirically examine the
magnitude of each of these alternatives, but as discussed previously, it appears that (b) is
the most likely explanation for these additional students.
30EaASU − EcASU = 8, 261
(
.111
1+.111
)
= 825 Students, EaUA − EcUA = 6, 804
(
.108
1+.108
)
= 663 Students,
EaNAU − EcNAU = 3, 789
(
.246
1+.246
)
= 748 Students
31This data has not been released for 2010.
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Using these calculations, I can also obtain a rough estimate of the dollar value of the
transfer to students who would attend ASU, UA, or NAU regardless of whether the scholar-
ship was available. Multiplying a simple weighted average of tuition in 2010 from Table 2.1
($8,788) by the 718 students who would have attended one of these universities regardless of
whether the scholarship was available, yields an estimated $5.8 million subsidy to incoming
freshmen that did not affect enrollment decisions.
2.4 Conclusions
This paper finds strong evidence of an AIMS effect on enrollment at Arizona’s three large in-
state universities: Arizona State University (ASU), University of Arizona (UA) and Northern
Arizona University (NAU). These enrollment effects are strongest for black and Hispanic stu-
dents. I do not find evidence that AIMS impacts the quality of students at these universities
as measured by ACT scores of incoming freshmen and retention rates. I do, however, find
that AIMS led to an increase in tuition and fees. Results obtained from DD estimation as
well as SC groups are consistent. Furthermore, the specification is robust to placebo tests.
While these results are quite consistent with CMS’s analysis of the HOPE scholarship,
there are several differences between AIMS and HOPE that can provide insight about
statewide merit-based scholarships. First, the scholarships were implemented in different
time periods. HOPE was implemented in 1993 while AIMS began in 2006. Because a grow-
ing number of students are attending college every year, the marginal contribution of any
program aimed at increasing enrollment might be hypothesized to be lower today than it
was in 1993. Therefore, analyzing a scholarship that was implemented in 1993 might not be
relevant for a policy maker wanting to create or change a policy today. My research shows
that AIMS was effective at increasing enrollment in 2006.
The second obvious difference between the programs is the geographic region of the
country where the scholarships were implemented. If these programs are more effective for a
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particular demographic of students, and that demographic is more common in Georgia than
Arizona, for instance, then this might explain the difference in outcomes. In particular, I
find that the scholarship is most effective among black and Hispanic students. Given these
results, it is not surprising that both AIMS and HOPE were effective in their respective states
whose populations are comprised of a large percent of Hispanics and blacks respectively.
Finally, it is possible that the requirements of obtaining a scholarship might have an
impact that scholarship’s effectiveness. In particular, the AIMS scholarship has much stricter
requirements than does HOPE, but nonetheless the program was still effective at increasing
enrollment. It must be noted that Georgia’s HOPE scholarship can be used at any approved
school in Georgia, while AIMS is restricted only to Arizona’s three largest state schools (ASU,
UA, and NAU). It is unknown whether AIMS would have had an impact on enrollment at
other schools in Arizona if it were available.
While we have learned a great deal about merit-based scholarship programs, there are
still many questions that have not been answered. First, I have estimated that merit-based
scholarship programs can lead to an increase in tuition. This increase in tuition, though can
have a negative impact on enrollment (Berger & Kosta 2002, Dellas & Sakellaris 2003). This
paper is only able to test for the net of the increase in enrollment due to the scholarship’s
availability to some students and the decrease in enrollment associated with the increase in
tuition. Future research might be interested in testing for each effect separately.32
While similar, the effects of HOPE and AIMS on many of the variables of interest are
not identical. I am only able to hypothesize on why these differences exist. Future research
might be interested in the relationship between enrollment effects of a scholarship and the
minimum requirements necessary to be eligible for the scholarship, for instance. It can be
hypothesized that more stringent scholarships will have smaller impacts on enrollment, but
the difference in magnitudes of these effects are unknown. This research will be useful to
32It is possible to use tuition as a control variable in the estimation of the AIMS effect on enrollment,
but the inclusion of this variable will create an endogeneity problem, as tuition and enrollment are jointly
determined by both the supply and demand for college. For this reason, tuition was not used as a control
variable in these regressions.
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policy makers when constructing or changing scholarships.
Future research might also be interested in whether scholarships have become less effective
as time has progressed. This might be the case if less students today are “on the margin” of
whether or not to attend college. If this is the case, then a scholarship program might have
a smaller effect today than it did when HOPE was implemented. While this paper shows
that AIMS was effective at increasing enrollment, it is unknown how much of an impact the
program would have had on enrollment if it were implemented a decade earlier.
The possibilities for future research on state merit-based scholarship programs are vast,
and a better understanding of these programs will allow policy makers to design programs
that maximize outcomes of interest while minimizing the overall cost of the program. This
research will add to the understanding of the AIMS scholarship in particular as well as to
the broader literature on scholarship programs.
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Chapter 3. Housing Wealth and College
Enrollment
3.1 Introduction
As discussed in Chapter 2, college enrollment has increased dramatically in the United States
since the 1970s. In 1970, 5.8 million students were attending college full time. By 2010,
this number increased to 14.7 million, an increase of over 150 percent (Snyder and Dillow,
2011). It is therefore no surprise that a vast literature on college attendance has emerged
within the last several decades. For instance, it is well documented that students respond to
financial aid by increasing enrollment (Dynarski, 2004; Bettinger, 2004; Avery and Hoxby,
2004; Cornwell, Lee, and Mustard, 2005; Cornwell, Mustard, and Sridhar, 2006; Upton, 2014)
and that increases in college tuition and fees can lead to a decrease in college enrollment
(Jackson and Weathersby, 1975; John, 1990; Kane, 1994, 1995; Heller, 1997; Hemelt and
Marcotte, 2011).
The relationship between economic conditions and college enrollment has been found to
be countercyclical at both the graduate (Bedard and Herman, 2008) and undergraduate levels
(Dellas and Koubi, 2003; Dellas and Sakellaris, 2003; Berger and Kostal, 2002; Black and
Sufi, 2002; Card and Lemieux, 2000; Light, 1996; Betts and McFarland, 1995; Kane, 1994;
Corman, 1983; Gustman and Steineier, 1981). While this has been observed empirically,
theoretically the cyclicality of schooling is ambiguous. Low skilled wages decrease during
a recession and therefore the opportunity cost of going to college is low. Furthermore,
during a recession families’ ability to help finance their children’s college expenses decreases.
More recent literature (Long, 2014) explored the net effect of the most recent 2008 Great
Recession on college enrollment. Using states with large increases in unemployment and large
reductions in home prices as the treatment group and states with relatively small changes
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in unemployment and housing prices as the control, Long (2014) found that the net effect of
the recession on college enrollment is positive, corroborating past research which found that
college enrollment is countercyclical.
There has also been a vast literature on the impact of housing wealth on an assortment
of economic outcomes. For instance, increases in housing wealth can lead to increases in
personal consumption (Gan, 2010; Slacalek, 2009) as accessing home equity can be used as a
means to smooth consumption over time (Hurst and Stafford, 2004). There is also suggestive
evidence that increases in housing wealth can help to ease individual liquidity constraints as
households with higher levels of housing wealth are more likely to own businesses or engage in
other entrepreneurial activities (Hurst and Lusardi, 2004). Housing wealth can even impact
the age at which people retire (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007).
Merging these two strands of literature, some researchers have investigated the impact
of housing markets on college enrollment. Housing wealth is a potential source of credit
for families that are attempting to finance their childrens’ education, as families can choose
to borrow against their home’s value to obtain a loan for their childrens’ college education
(Bennet, Peach, and Peristianai, 2001; Deep and Domanski, 2002; Greenspan and Kennedy,
2005; Doms and Krainer, 2007). Housing wealth is a very plausible source of financing
for many college students as 85 percent of college attendees come from families who own
a home and, for all but the wealthiest families, their home is their only major financial
asset (Lovenheim, 2011). For these reasons, Lovenheim and Reynolds (2013) and Lovenheim
(2011) tested for the impact of housing wealth on college choices and found that increases in
housing wealth can lead to an increase in college enrollment and allows students to substitute
away from two-year schools towards flagship four-year public universities.
I am able to improve on the existing literature that analyzes the impact of housing wealth
on college decisions in several ways. First, I employ a large and detailed proprietary data
set not previously used in this literature, BlackBox Logic (BBx), which provides information
on over 90 percent of the privately securitized mortgages in the United States since the
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year 1999 which includes about 21 million unique loans.1 I have information on the amount
of each individual loan at origination as well as detailed monthly payment histories of each
mortgage. I know if and when a household has missed a mortgage payment or if they decided
to make extra payments above the contractually obligated payments and therefore I know the
amount outstanding on the loan. I aggregate individual loans up to the metropolitan areas
where these homes are located for our measures of housing wealth. The data are described
in detail in Section 3.2.1.
Second, Lovenheim and Reynolds (2013) and Lovenheim (2011) focused on the housing
bubble that occurred in the late 1990s and early 2000s–extending their analysis to only 2005.
I focus my attention on both the bubble and subsequent financial crisis by utilizing data from
2001 to 2010. I argue that the “shock” that occurred during the financial crisis to housing
wealth is exogenous to college enrollment, therefore mitigating the need for instrumental
variable estimation. If the severity of the housing crisis in an area was impacted by the
college enrollment decisions within an area, then my exogeneity assumption will not be
valid. I provide evidence that my assumption of exogeneity is plausible.
Thirdly, I am able to estimate the effect of housing wealth on college enrollment at
private and public schools separately. I find that the housing crisis lead to an increase in
enrollment at public institutions, and a decrease in enrollment in private institutions. Long
(2014) found that college enrollment increased in areas where housing prices fell drastically.
I expand on this result finding that students substitute away from more expensive private
colleges to more affordable public institutions when their families experience a reduction in
their housing wealth.
I am also able to extend my analysis to beyond housing wealth itself. I test if an in-
crease in mortgage delinquencies and foreclosures lead to a decline in college enrollment. As
households face severe financial distress and have fewer resources to pay for educational
1This paper focuses on data from 2001 to 2010.
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expenses, this will potentially alter students’ educational decisions. To date, no research has
specifically tested the impact of foreclosures on college enrollment.
In Section 3.2.1 I describe the data used. I provide details on the construction of the
housing wealth measures used in my models in 3.2.2-3.2.4. I briefly discuss some summary
statistics in Section 3.2.5. Finally, in Section 3.2.6 I present the regression specifications
utilized in my analysis.
3.2 Empirical Strategy
3.2.1 Data
Five datasets are employed in this paper. I use the Integrated Post Secondary Education
Data System (IPEDS) published by the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES)
for the independent variable of interest, college enrollment. IPEDS has yearly data on over
7,400 colleges and universities throughout the United States. The independent variable used
in this paper is the first-year first-time enrollment of freshman for full time students.
Data on local housing prices comes from the seasonally adjusted Federal Housing Finance
Agency house price index (FHFA-HPI). I use quarterly observations for the 75 metro areas
tracked by the FHFA-HPI. I will show that results are robust when the S&P/Case-Shiller
house price index (CS-HPI) is used. Loan-level data is from BlackBox Logic, LLC (BBx).2
This database covers over 90 percent of non-agency residential securitizied mortgages includ-
ing prime, alt-a, and subprime loans. BBx has detailed mortgage contract information at
the point of loan origination as well as monthly records of mortgage payment information.
For this study, only first-lien, single family owner-occupied properties located in a FHFA-
HPI city are used. BBx contains information on over 21 million loans and includes over 800
million monthly remittance records as of December 2012. Details on variables utilized from
2Detailed BBx data information is available at http://www.bbxlogic.com/data.htm.
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this dataset are discussed in the subsequent section. Data on local economic characteristics
come from the Quarterly Workforce Indicators (QWI) data from the U.S. Census Bureau.
QWI is a unique dataset in that it provides average wages by education level at the metro
and micropolitan area levels in the United States.
3.2.2 Housing Leverage Measures
One of the main contributions of this paper is the detailed estimate of the housing wealth
within a metropolitan area. I use three groups of housing wealth indicators (HWI), the
first of which examines borrower leverage. I calculate an estimate of the current loan to
value (CLTV) ratio for individual mortgage remittance report observations and calculate
the average CLTV ratio for a given metro area for a given year. The following methodology
is used to calculate estimated CLTV ratios, for each loan, l, at each monthly observation,
t=m. This variable is constructed with five key data points: the loan to value ratio at
origination, which includes the mortgage balance at origination, (MBt=0), and value of the
home at time of origination (Vt=0), mortgage balance outstanding at time of observation,
(MBt=m), the house price index level for a given city, i, at origination (HPIit=0), and the
house price index level for that city, i, at the time of the observation (HPIit=m). I only use
observations for loans on properties located in the 75 cities tracked by the FHFA-HPI.
Loan to value (LTV) ratios at origination are calculated using information from the
BBx dataset. The loan to value ratio at origination expresses a borrower’s leverage at the
beginning of the life of the loan. For example, if a borrower makes a 20 percent down
payment, the LTV ratio at origination will be 0.8. A LTV ratio of 1 indicates the home
purchase is 100 percent financed, and a ratio of greater than 1 indicates the loan amount is
greater than the housing value at origination.
LTVt=0 =
MBt=0
Vt=0
(3.1)
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The denominator of this ratio, property value, is known precisely only at the time of sale be-
cause it is the total purchase price of the home. Appraisals are typically conducted as part of
the sale process and may be conducted at other points during the tenure of the homeowner;
for example, an appraisal may be conducted at the point of mortgage refinance.3 Although
exact housing prices are only known at the point of sale, housing appraisals for loans orig-
inated as refinances give an approximation of expected house selling price; the appraiser,
who observes many transactions, can help reduce the uncertainty in the estimated value of
property (Quan and Quigley, 1991). Since property appraisals themselves are estimates and
are conducted infrequently and at irregular intervals, a precise monthly measure of the LTV
ratio after the point of origination is not feasible. Since LTV ratios are not updated contin-
uously, the estimate of the CLTV ratio measure provides a reasonable proxy for expressing
the current residential housing market environment individual borrowers face.
Monthly payment records for each loan are recorded in the BBx database. The sum of
all payments from origination to point of observation gives the reduction of the mortgage
balance outstanding from t=0 to t=m. In calculating the CLTV ratio, the numerator will
be the origination mortgage balance, MBt=0, adjusted for the change in mortgage balance
outstanding since origination. Since current value of the home is not precisely known, I use
a change in the HPI level for city i from t=0 to t=m to approximate for the changes in the
local housing market since origination. The current loan to value estimate (CLTV) is given
by:
CLTVit =
(
(MBt=0 + ∆MB)
(Vt=0) · (1 + ∆HPIi)
)
(3.2)
where ∆MB equals the change in mortgage balance from t=0 to t=m, ∆HPIi is the per-
centage change in the house price index for city i from t=0 to t=m and Vt=0 is the property
value at origination. I calculate average CLTV ratios for each metro area for each school
year.4 Since LTV ratios are a measure of borrower leverage, I would expect borrowers with
3The sample includes refinanced loans. The denominator of the LTV ratio at origination for these loans
is the most recent appraisal value of the property.
4School year is measured as August of a given calendar year to July of the following calendar year.
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higher current leverage would be more financially constrained and this may negatively impact
college enrollment choices.
Next I create a variable to measure changes in borrower financial constraint over time.
Using the original LTV ratio from Equation 3.1 and the estimate of the CLTV ratio from
Equation 3.2 I calculate the estimated change in equity from origination to the point of
observation. Equity is 1 minus the loan to value ratio.5 The change in equity for a loan
located in city i observed at time t is given by:
∆Equityit = (1− CLTVit)− (1− LTVit) (3.3)
I construct a variable that measures the prevalence of positive equity changes for a given
geographic area. I create an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if an individual
has experienced a strictly positive change in equity since origination, and a value of 0 if the
individual has experienced an equity change of less than or equal to zero since origination. I
then calculate the percentage of borrowers in a given metro area for a given year that have had
positive equity change since origination. All else equal, I anticipate that as the percentage
of borrowers in a metro area that have had a positive change of equity since origination
increases, so will the likelihood of enrollment at more expensive private universities.
3.2.3 Access to Home Equity
I use three variables related to accessibility of home equity. One common method through
which borrowers can utilize existing equity is home equity lines of credit (HELOCs). A nec-
essary, but not sufficient, condition to be able to access home equity through a HELOC is the
loan not being “underwater." An underwater mortgage is a loan where the borrower currently
owes more on the mortgage balance outstanding than the home is currently estimated to be
5A borrower’s change in home equity is a function of monthly payment choices by the borrower, given by
monthly remittance records, as well as changes in the value of the property, as measured by the FHFA-HPI.
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worth. In other words, the borrower has negative equity. Using the value from Equation 3.2,
if the CLTV ratio is greater than 1 then the indicator variable underwater takes the value
1. Otherwise, underwater equals 0. I then calculate the percentage of borrowers in a given
metro area for a given school year that have underwater mortgages. All else equal, I would
anticipate a higher percentage of underwater borrowers would result in a decrease in private
school enrollment.
Next, I determine if a borrower would be likely to be eligible for a HELOC, and if so,
approximately how much she would be able to borrow. To determine HELOC eligibility and
amount, I first use the estimated current equity, expressed as a percentage of original loan
amount:
CurrentEquityLevelit = (1− CLTVit) (3.4)
Next I use the original property value, Vt=0, adjusted for the change in value since origination
by the HPI, to calculate the current equity amount in dollars.
EquityAmountit = CurrentEquityLevelit · (Vt=0 · (1 + ∆HPIi)) (3.5)
If EquityAmount is greater than zero and the loan is current in payments at the time of
the observation6 then I anticipate that loan will be eligible for a HELOC. If the loan has a
value of zero or less for EquityAmount or a payment status indicator of anything other than
“current” then I designate that loan as currently ineligible for a HELOC. If a loan is not
eligible for a HELOC at the time of loan observation it will take a value of $0 for the two
HELOC amount variables used in this analysis.
If a borrower is eligible for a HELOC, the maximum amount they could borrow is a
function of the amount of equity they currently have in the property. Rarely are borrowers
allowed by banks to borrow 100% of estimated available equity. The percentage of equity
individuals are allowed to borrow varies across lenders, time, and other borrower risk factors
6Loan payment status from BBx database and is discussed in greater detail in Section 3.2.4.
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that I cannot directly observe, but maximum HELOC amount typically ranges between 70%
and 85% of current equity amount. Therefore, I create two variables, a low estimate for
maximum HELOC and a high estimate for maximum HELOC to encapsulate the range of
possible maximum home equity loan amounts possible for borrowers.
HELOCamount(low)it = EquityAmountit · 0.70 (3.6)
HELOCamount(high)it = EquityAmountit · 0.85 (3.7)
I then find an average low and high HELOC eligibility amount for each metro area for each
school year. All else equal, I anticipate as the amount of home equity accessible to borrowers
increases, enrollment in private universities will increase. For ease of interpretation, I scale
this variable by $10,000s.
3.2.4 Foreclosures
I use three variables related to measures of mortgage delinquency and foreclosure. First I
examine the effect of delinquency in payments. In the BBx dataset, each remittance report
includes a description of the current payment status of the loan. Loans that are identified
as being either 30 or 60 days late in payments at the time of the observation are considered
to be delinquent. This level of delinquency is commonly termed a “mild default." I find
that the percentage of loans within a given metro area for a given year are non-current in
payments, but not in foreclosure at the time the loan is observed. Delinquency is a measure
of mild financial distress; some non-current borrowers recover and regain their current loan
status, but others continue down the path of missed payments and eventually face foreclosure.
All else equal, I would expect a rise in delinquencies to have a negative impact on college
enrollment decisions.
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Within the BBx dataset there are several indicators of severe loan distress. Non-current
payment status indicators that are stronger signals of distress than the previously defined
mild delinquencies include 90 or more days late, loan in judicial foreclosure proceedings, loan
liquidation, real estate-owned (bank-owned property awaiting sale), or borrower bankruptcy
filing. Even though these categories of delinquency have different legal implications, they
are all indicators of severe loan distress. For the purposes of this analysis, a loan with any
of these payment status indicators is broadly classified as a property in foreclosure. Again,
I calculate the percentage of loans within a given metro area for a given year that have
any of these foreclosure indicators at the point of observation. Although some borrowers
may recover to current status either on their own or through loan modification programs,
the lack of payment for at least three months on a home mortgage, all else equal, suggests
the borrower has a high level of financial constraint or distress. Similar to the delinquency
variable, I would expect a rise in foreclosures to negatively impact enrollment decisions, but
I would expect the effect to be stronger than for foreclosures than delinquencies.
Finally, I measure the impact of having any negative payment event in the past twelve
months. For each school year, I select a single month, June, to observe all mortgages active
at that date. Then I examine the past twelve months of payment history for each loan. In
addition to the delinquency and foreclosure-related values of the payment status mentioned
above, the payment status indicator also could indicate that the loan is current, the loan
has been prepaid in full, or there is no record of the loan for a given month.7 If a loan has
any payment status indicators for one or more of the previous 12 months other than current,
prepaid, or no record then the indicator variable for loan distress in the past year equals 1.
All else equal, I would expect as percentage of loans that have some kind of negative payment
indicator in the past year for a given city, enrollment choices for the following school year
would be negatively impacted.
7Since our database shows remittance records for securitized loans, there will be no observation values
for points in time after the loan was originated, but before the loan was securitized, which is typically 3-6
months.
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3.2.5 Summary Statistics
Table 3.1 shows the average LTV for mortgages is 68 percent. This means that the loan
amount is 68 percent of the value of the home on average across all years 2001-2010. The
average percent with a positive equity change is approximately 81 percent over the full sample
period. The average amount that a lender would likely be willing to provide as a HELOC is
between $43,700 and $53,100 and there are about 9 percent of borrowers with zero or negative
equity in their homes. Concerning missed payments and foreclosure activities, 30 percent of
borrowers were delinquent at some point over the last 12 months, 8 percent are currently in
mild default, and 12 percent are currently facing foreclosure activity. Three variables that
are employed in the robustness checks are also listed. The average change in the LTV ratio
between 2005 and 2009 was 10.7 percent. The number of the employees of all colleges and
universities within a metro area as a ratio of the total workforce in 2005 (pre-recession) is
2.5 percent while the number of incoming freshmen at all colleges and universities as a ratio
of the size of the total workforce is 1.4 percent. These variables will be discussed in more
detail in section 3.4.
3.2.6 Empirical Model
Following Long (2014), I first test for the net effect of the housing market downturn on college
enrollment using a difference-in-differences estimation technique presented in Equation (3.8)
where the treated schools are those in metropolitan areas that were severely impacted by the
housing crisis and the “control” schools are those that were in areas that were not severely
impacted by the housing crisis. Consistent with Long (2014), the treatment begins in 2007
and extends to the 2010, the final year in our sample. I selected the treatment and control
groups from the population of the 75 metro areas tracked by the Federal Housing Finance
Agency’s Housing Price Index (FHFA-HPI). Taking the change in the FHFA-HPI for each
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
Sample Average Std. Dev. N
College Level Variables
First-Year First-Time Enrollment
Public Schools 1,712 1,457 4,920
Private Schools 430 515 10,955
In State Tuition and Fees
Public Schools $5,042 $2,486 5,973
Private Schools $16,768 8,057 14,142
Real Estate Variables
Average Current LTV 67.9% 20.8% 561
Percent with Positive Equity Change 80.6% 30.1% 561
HELOC Amount (High) 5.31 3.49 975
HELOC Amount (Low) 4.37 2.88 975
Percent of Borrowers with No Equity 8.9% 16.9% 975
Percent with delinquency in past 12 months 30.3% 13.1% 561
Percent with delinquency in past 90 days 8.2% 2.5% 561
Percent with Current Foreclosure Activity 11.8% 8.9% 561
Economic and Demographic Variables
Wages of Workers with High School Educ. $2,382 $393 7,321
Percent White 86.2% 12.5% 7,475
Percent Black 9.2% 11.2% 7,475
Percent Hispanic 4.5% 13.0% 7,475
Percent With College Degree 20.3% 5.0% 7,321
Percent With Some College 32.6% 1.8% 7,261
Percent With High School Degree 33.7% 4.6% 7,321
Metro Level Characteristics
Change FHFA-HPI from 2005 2009 10.7% 18.1% 48
College Employees Total Workforce 2.5% 1.1% 48
Incoming Freshmen Total Workforce 1.4% 0.8% 48
LTV ≡ “Loan to Value”, HELOC ≡ Home Equity Line of Credit. HELOC amounts are in tens of
thousands of dollars. Wages of Workers with High School Education are average monthly earnings.
city from 4th quarter of 2005 to 4th quarter of 2009, I identify the 10 metro areas that had
the most favorable outcomes8 (least affected by the crisis) as the control group and the 10
metro areas that had the largest price declines as the treatment group9.
8Control group is comprised of Austin, TX, Houston, TX, Raleigh, NC, Buffalo, NY, Tulsa, OK, Okla-
homa City, OK, Pittsburgh, PA, Charlotte, NC, San Antonio, TX, and Dallas, TX.
9Treatment group is comprised of Detroit, MI, Phoenix, AZ, Fresno, CA, West Palm Beach, FL, Oakland,
CA, Ft. Lauderdale, FL, Sacramento, CA, Bakersfield, CA, Riverside, CA, and Las Vegas, NV.
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I estimate Equation (3.8) below.
ln(Enrollmenti,t) = α+β1
(
Busti,m×Aftert
)
+β2Busti,m+β3Aftert+β5H.S. wagemt+θT + 
(3.8)
Where Busti,m is school i in metro area m where the housing market downturn was severe
and zero in areas where the housing crisis was was relatively not severe and Aftert is a dummy
for 2007 to 2010, after the crisis hit. H.S. wagemt is the average earnings of a worker with
high school degree in metropolitan area m. I employ this specification with (a) all 4-year
schools pooled together; (b) only 4-year public schools; and (c) only 4-year private schools
to see if the housing crisis impacted different types of institutions differently.
Next, I extend our analysis to all schools, not just schools in the areas that were heavily
impacted and lightly impacted by the housing crisis.10 Equation 3.9 describes the main
empirical relationship that is being analyzed where Enrollmenti,t is first-year first-time en-
rollment in college i in year t, HWIm,t−1 is a housing wealth indicator in metropolitan area
m in year t−1. I employ multiple measures of housing wealth including current loan to value
ratio, change in equity from origination, percentage of borrowers with underwater mortgages,
and potential access to home equity as discussed in Section 3.2.1. H.S. wagemt is the average
wage of a worker with a high school diploma (and no additional education) in metro area
m and X ′m,t includes a group of covariates that include local metro level characteristics such
as the percent of workers with college degrees and percent of workers that are white. A
yearly time trend, T , and school level fixed effects Dm are also included in all empirical
specifications.
ln(Enrollmenti,t) = α + β1 ln
(
HWIm,t−1
)
+ β2H.S. wagemt + γX
′
i,t + θT + ρDm +  (3.9)
All housing wealth indicators are compiled for August-July, and are therefore on a “school
10This paper focuses exclusively on all four-year private schools and four-year public schools in metro areas
where QWI wage data as well as FHFA or Case-Shiller housing price indexes are available. Due to these
data constraints not all schools country-wide can be included.
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year” instead of a traditional calendar year. Our specification tests for the impact of the
HWI in the previous school year (t− 1) on enrollment the current school year (t).
Next, I will analyze the impact of housing foreclosures on college enrollment. Equation
3.10 describes this empirical relationship.
ln(Enrollmenti,t) = α + β ln
(
Fm,t−1
)
+ γX ′i,t + θDt + ρDm +  (3.10)
Where Fm,t−1 are foreclosures in t− 1. Similar to HWI, this allows us to test for the impact
of foreclosures in t−1 on college enrollment in year t. I will use three measures of foreclosure
activity including the percent of mortgages that are currently in mild delinquency, the percent
with current foreclosure or severe delinquency activity (90 or more days delinquent) and the
percent that have been delinquent for any amount of time at least once within the last 12
months.
Our empirical specification assumes that the housing crisis is exogenous both over time
and across geographic areas to college enrollment. In normal times, assuming that changes
in the HWI is exogenous both over time and geographic area to college enrollment may be
considered implausible. However, I specifically target the first decade of the 21st century, as
the housing downturn occurred within this time frame. Housing wealth will be endogenous
to college enrollment if (a) areas that have more college enrollment produce citizens with
higher incomes who therefore accumulate more housing wealth or (b) unobserved local area
economic conditions impact both people’s housing wealth as well as their college enrollment
decisions.
To illustrate this point, Figure 3.1 shows the average housing prices in using the FHFA-
HPI National Composite over this time period as well as the percentage of mortgage balances
outstanding 90 or more days delinquent as given by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York
quarterly report on household debt and credit. The housing price index peaks in 2006 and
then experiences a drastic fall from 2007 to 2010. I also see a large increase in foreclosures
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Figure 3.1: College Enrollment, Housing Prices, and Foreclosure National Trends
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that lags behind the change in housing prices. This is not surprising seeing that as housing
prices fall drastically, more people will be “underwater” on their mortgage and therefore
decide (or are forced) to foreclose. What is important, is that these events occurred due
to the financial crisis and subsequent global recession and not due to college enrollment
decisions in the United States.
Figure 3.2 further illustrates the extent to which the housing crisis was indeed an exoge-
nous shock. The average current loan to value (CLTV) ratio increased rapidly during the
recession which lasted from December of 2007 to June of 2009.11 Simultaneously, there was
a large drop in leverage since origination. Both of these graphs show a drastic jump in these
indicators that occur during the time period in which the Great Recession occurred.
While the housing crisis was certainly a nation-wide event, it did not impact the entire
United States equally. Figure 3.3 shows the change in the FHFA housing price index from
2004–2006 and 2007–2009. Some states, such as Nevada, Florida, Arizona, and California
suffered very severe housing price declines, while others such as Texas, Oklahoma, North
Dakota, and South Dakota actually saw mild growth throughout the crisis period. In our
regression specifications I use school level fixed effects and control for local demographic
characteristics and yearly wage levels to help reduce the effects of omitted variables that
could be correlated with the severity of the housing crisis in a local area. I argue that the
difference in the severity of this housing crisis across the United States was not impacted by
college enrollment and is thus exogenous to college enrollment in our empirical specifications.
This allows us to unbiasedly estimate the impact of housing wealth and foreclosures on college
enrollment using a panel specification, taking advantage of variation over time as well across
metropolitan areas within the United States.
The argument could be made that economic conditions during the financial crisis period
within our sample made it more difficult for individuals to get credit to finance college.
Therefore, any decline in college enrollment might be due to credit constraints, not necessarily
11Source: NBER Business Cycle Expansions and Contractions.
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Figure 3.2: Changes in Housing Wealth Indicators During Great Recession
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Figure 3.3: State Level Change in Housing Price Index
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housing markets themselves. I find this story implausible, as households facing negative
economic events, such as loss of a job, would have increased access to credit through the
gaining eligibility for larger dollar amounts of federal student aid. I address other potential
problems with treating the housing crisis as exogenous to college enrollment in section 3.4.
3.3 Results
3.3.1 Net Effect on Enrollment
First, I estimate the net effect of the 2008 recession as measured by the severity of the
housing collapse in a metro area on college enrollment.12 Table 3.2 presents these results.
Overall, I estimate a 6.2 percent decrease in college enrollment in schools that were heavily
impacted by the housing crisis. This result differs from Long (2014) who finds that the great
recession had a net positive impact on college enrollment. While our point estimate is in the
opposite direction, our estimated net effect is not statistically significant. Next, I break this
effect into public and private schools separately. I find a statistically significant and positive
impact of the housing crisis on public college enrollment as the housing crisis led to a 14.5
percent increase in public enrollment. On the other hand, I find a negative impact of the
housing crisis on four-year private school enrollment. While the point estimate for four-year
private enrollment is not statistically significant, I estimate that the housing crisis led to a
11.8 percent decrease in enrollment–a change in the opposite direction as public enrollment.
The main difference between the interpretation of our result and the result of Long
(2014) is that Long (2014) estimates the net effect of the great recession, and is therefore
not controlling for wages or any other variables that might have also been impacted by the
recession. In my specification, I control for low-skilled wages, which represent the opportunity
cost of attending college, in order to estimate the effect of the housing market downturn.
12I use logged values for enrollment in all specifications.
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Table 3.2: The Net Effect of the Housing Crisis on College Enrollment
All 4 Yr Public 4 Yr Private
Treatment Effect -0.0623 0.145∗∗∗ -0.118
(0.0980) (0.0304) (0.123)
Recession High 0.0133 0.970∗∗ -0.720∗∗
(0.259) (0.380) (0.320)
Post Recession 0.0583 0.0316 0.0276
(0.0389) (0.0499) (0.0731)
Ln Avg Wage -0.738 -0.386 -0.716
Unskilled Workers (0.636) (0.618) (0.596)
Year Trend 0.0209 0.0211 0.0426∗∗
(0.0211) (0.0225) (0.0199)
Observations 1119 265 591
All Standard errors clustered at CBSA level. Treated schools are
located in areas that were heavily impacted by the housing crisis.
Control schools are located in areas were impacted relatively less
harshly. The post treatment time period is 2007 to 2010.
This result presented in Table 3.2 is intuitive. The average in-state tuition and fees from
Table 3.1 for private schools in our sample is almost $17,000, while average tuition and fees
at public universities is less than one third of the price, at about $5,000. When the housing
market collapse hit, families likely substituted away from more expensive private schools to
more affordable four-year public institutions.
3.3.2 Leverage and Access to Home Equity
The impact of housing leverage and leverage changes over time is presented in Table 3.3. A
10% increase in the CLTV (current loan to value) ratio in associated with a 7.3% increase in
college enrollment at public schools, but associated with a 12.2% decrease in private enroll-
ment. This result is consistent with the economic intuition that higher levels of leverage in a
household’s largest asset–their home–reduces the financial flexibility that may be necessary
to choose to send a child to a private university over a public university.
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Table 3.3: The Impact of Current Mortgage Leverage on College Enrollment.
Public Private
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln(Average 0.0730 -0.122
Current LTV ratio)t−1 (0.0678) (0.0783)
Percent with -0.0594 0.0934∗∗
Postive Equity Changet−1 (0.0437) (0.0433)
Ln Avg Wage -0.771∗ -0.701 -0.166 -0.298
Unskilled Workerst (0.397) (0.427) (0.397) (0.393)
Year Trend 0.0243∗∗ 0.0211 0.0286∗∗ 0.0347∗∗∗
(0.0113) (0.0126) (0.0107) (0.0110)
Observations 680 680 1664 1664
All Standard errors clustered at CBSA level. School level FE and metro specific
percent of workers with college degree and percent of workers that are white are used
in all regressions. Coefficients not shown. All schools that did not report enrollment
for all years between 2001 and 2010 and schools with less than 50 first year-first time
students are excluded.
To further examine this relationship between leverage and enrollment, I consider the
change in housing wealth since origination of the loan. While the CLTV ratio is simply
a point estimate of leverage for a given year, equity change since origination measures if
the household experienced an increase or decrease in housing wealth over the life of the
loan.13 As a larger percentage of borrowers have seen their wealth increase (as measured
by positive equity change from origination) and are better able to afford more expensive
education options for their children, I would expect this to lead to an increase in private
school enrollment and a decrease in public school enrollment.
As in all specifications, enrollment is in log form; positive equity change from origination
is expressed as a percentage for a given metro area. Therefore, for a 10 percentage point
increase in borrowers with a positive equity change in a FHFA metro area, I estimate this will
lead to a 5.9% decrease in public school enrollment and a 9.3% increase in private enrollment.
13I include refinanced properties in our sample. For those loans the direction of the change in wealth is
measured since refinance, not the original purchase of the property.
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Another facet of housing leverage, HELOC eligibility, is examined in Table 3.4. First I
examine the impact of being underwater, and therefore ineligible to borrow against housing
wealth, on college enrollment. The percentage of borrowers in a given metro area that
have no home equity at the end of a given school year negatively impacts private school
enrollment, but positively impacts public school enrollment in the following academic year.
For a 10 percentage point increase in borrowers who have no equity, I estimate this leads
to a 1.3% increase in public enrollment and a 2.9% decrease in private enrollment. This is
consistent with the story presented in Tables 3.2 and 3.3 that higher concentrations of more
financially constrained borrowers (with lower housing wealth) leads to a substitution away
from private institutions to public institutions.
To further quantify the financial relationship between changes in housing wealth and
college enrollment decisions, I estimate the effect of changes in HELOC eligibility amounts.
For a borrower with positive equity, all else equal, the borrower will likely be able to borrow
between 70 and 85 percent of his current estimated equity in the form of a HELOC loan.
There are two mechanisms through which home equity can increase: (1) the borrower makes
regular monthly payments;14 or (2) the property value increases.15
For ease of interpretation, I examine the impact of a $10,000 increase in HELOC eligibility
on enrollment decisions. A $10,000 increase in accessible housing wealth is estimated to lead
to between a 2.4% and 2.9% increase in private enrollment and no effect on public enrollment.
This is intuitive as the tuition and fees are more expensive compared to public institutions.
Therefore, it is plausible that a $10,000 increase in accessible housing wealth may influence
some substitution away from public to private schools as households are better able to afford
the more expensive tuition and fees charged by a private school.
14Borrower may also make larger than contractually required payments, leading to an even greater increase
in equity, all else equal.
15For borrowers with some exotic mortgage types such as interest only or negative amortization, housing
wealth will only increase as the house value increases.
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Table 3.4: The Impact of HELOC Potential on Full Time Enrollment.
Public Private
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Percent of 0.103 -0.287∗
Borrowers With No Equityt−1 (0.0893) (0.164)
Mean potential -0.00446 0.0240∗∗∗
HELOC amount (high)t−1 (0.00748) (0.00722)
Mean potential -0.00542 0.0292∗∗∗
HELOC amount (low)t−1 (0.00908) (0.00877)
Ln Avg Wage -0.750∗ -0.743 -0.743 -0.245 -0.420 -0.420
Unskilled Workerst (0.438) (0.497) (0.497) (0.404) (0.390) (0.390)
Year Trend 0.0245∗ 0.0254∗ 0.0254∗ 0.0306∗∗∗ 0.0311∗∗∗ 0.0311∗∗∗
(0.0128) (0.0142) (0.0142) (0.0112) (0.00980) (0.00980)
Observations 680 680 680 1664 1664 1664
All Standard errors clustered at CBSA level. School level FE and metro specific percent of workers with college
degree and percent of workers that are white are used in all regressions. Coefficients not shown. All schools
that did not report enrollment for all years between 2001 and 2010 and schools with less than 50 first year-first
time students are excluded.
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3.3.3 Foreclosures
Our third set of results examines the impact of household financial distress, as measured
by delinquency or foreclosure in mortgages, on college enrollment decisions. These results
are presented in Table 3.5. These results provide different insights than the housing wealth
measures in Tables 3.3 and 3.4 because these measures examine the impacts of household
financial constraints as measured by borrowers that are currently in delinquency or foreclo-
sure, or that missed at least one payment in the past year. Again, I see dichotomous results
between school types. Increased levels of mortgage delinquency or foreclosure in a given
metro area negatively impact private school enrollment, but lead to an increase in public
enrollment the following school year. As borrowers become unable to afford their homes,
they are likely unable to afford other major expenditures, including assisting their children
in financing their college educations. Therefore, they will substitute away from expensive
private schools to relatively inexpensive public schools.
3.3.4 Two-Year Schools
In all of the above specifications, I have examined the impact of housing market characteris-
tics on only 4-year colleges and universities. The reason for focusing on these institutions is
intuitive–the housing wealth channel explored in this paper will only impact college enroll-
ment decisions if the parents of college age students own houses to begin with. If an effect
is observed for students whose parents are not plausible homeowners on average, then it is
likely not a housing wealth effect that is being observed, but instead an effect of the business
cycle that is correlated with housing wealth within an area.
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Table 3.5: The Impact of Foreclosure on Full Time Enrollment.
Public Private
Percent with 0.0525 -0.432∗∗
current foreclosure activityt−1 (0.166) (0.206)
Percent with 0.0666 -0.301∗∗
delinquency in past 12 monthst−1 (0.118) (0.141)
Percent with 0.306 -1.514∗∗
delinquency less than 90 dayst−1 (0.625) (0.616)
Ln Avg Wage -0.785 -0.764 -0.784∗ -0.362 -0.316 -0.207
Unskilled Workerst (0.472) (0.462) (0.439) (0.411) (0.403) (0.396)
Year Trend 0.0255 0.0235 0.0243 0.0384∗∗∗ 0.0400∗∗∗ 0.0355∗∗∗
(0.0154) (0.0157) (0.0153) (0.0130) (0.0137) (0.0119)
Observations 680 680 680 1664 1664 1664
All Standard errors clustered at CBSA level. School level FE and metro specific percent of workers with college
degree and percent of workers that are white are used in all regressions. Coefficients not shown. All schools
that did not report enrollment for all years between 2001 and 2010 and schools with less than 50 first year-first
time students are excluded.
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As stated earlier, housing wealth is a very plausible source of financing for many college
students as 85 percent of college attendees come from families who own a home and, for all
but the wealthiest families, their home is their only major financial asset (Lovenheim, 2011).
While this seems intuitive for students who are attending 4-year colleges and universities, it
is less obvious that students attending two-year schools, such as local community colleges,
will be impacted by this housing wealth channel.
Table 3.6 shows the estimated impact of all of the housing wealth and mortgage delin-
quency variables used in Tables 3.3-3.5 focusing specifically on two-year schools only.16 As
can be seen, of the eight housing market characteristics presented, only one has a statistically
significant effect at the 10 percent level. In other words, there is not sufficient evidence to
conclude that changes in the housing market impacted two-year college enrollment. These
results are consistent with intuition. The housing wealth channel does not appear to have an
impact on two-year enrollment, as many of these students’ parents are plausibly less likely
to be homeowners.
3.3.5 Low-Skilled Wages and College Enrollment
What is consistently observed in Tables 3.2–3.6 is a negative relationship between the wage
of individuals within the metro area with a high school degree and college enrollment. This
is consistent with previous research (Dellas and Koubi, 2003; Dellas and Sakellaris, 2003;
Berger and Kostal, 2002; Black and Sufi, 2002; Card and Lemieux, 2000; Light, 1996; Betts
and McFarland, 1995; Kane, 1994; Corman, 1983; Gustman and Steineier, 1981) and is
theoretically sound. As the opportunity cost of going to college decreases (such as during
a recession), people will be more likely to attend college. The low-skilled wage is estimated
to have a larger impact on public school enrollment than private school enrollment, as the
average of the point estimates from Tables 3.3–3.5 suggest a 10 percent increase in unskilled
16This includes all public and private schools that do not offer any degree higher than a two-year associates
degree.
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Table 3.6: Housing Wealth and Two-Year College Enrollment.
Ln(Average -0.507
Current LTV ratio)t−1 (0.486)
Percent with 0.234
Postive Equity Changet−1 (0.216)
Percent of -2.164
Borrowers With No Equityt−1 (1.652)
Mean potential -0.0321
HELOC amount (high)t−1 (0.0744)
Mean potential -0.0390
HELOC amount (low)t−1 (0.0903)
Percent with -1.628∗
current foreclosure activityt−1 (0.876)
Percent with -0.942
delinquency in past 12 monthst−1 (0.573)
Percent with -4.026
delinquency less than 90 dayst−1 (2.542)
Ln Avg Wage -1.814 -1.946∗∗ -2.196∗∗ -1.121 -1.121 -2.028∗∗ -1.877∗ -1.703
Unskilled Workerst (1.092) (0.894) (0.910) (0.753) (0.753) (0.903) (0.948) (1.043)
Year Trend 0.0814∗ 0.0832∗∗ 0.0983∗∗ 0.0528∗ 0.0528∗ 0.0993∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗ 0.0896∗∗
(0.0406) (0.0317) (0.0365) (0.0278) (0.0278) (0.0294) (0.0344) (0.0368)
Observations 403 403 403 403 403 403 403 403
All Standard errors clustered at CBSA level. School level FE and metro specific percent of workers with college degree and percent
of workers that are white are used in all regressions. Coefficients not shown. All schools that did not report enrollment for all years
between 2001 and 2010 and schools with less than 50 first year-first time students are excluded.
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wages in a metro area leads to a 7.5% decrease in public school enrollment and a 3% decrease
in private enrollment.
Interestingly, two-year school enrollment is estimated to be impacted the most by the
low-skilled wage. The magnitude of these estimates are orders of magnitudes larger than
estimates in results for four-year institutions. I estimate that a 10 percent increase in the un-
skilled wage leads to an 11 to 22 percent decrease in two-year school enrollment. Magnitudes
for four-year schools ranged from about 3 to 7.5 percent. While I do not find evidence that
the housing market bubble and subsequent collapse impacted two-year school enrollment,
the low skilled wage has a relatively large impact on two-year enrollment.
3.4 Robustness
3.4.1 Case-Shiller Index
All previous housing wealth indicators were obtained using the FHFA 75 city composite
index. Another commonly used housing price index is the Case-Shiller 20 City Composite
Home Price Index (CS). CS and FHFA are similar in that they both use repeat-sales valua-
tions in creating their indexes. While similar, they are different in that CS is value weighted,
and therefore more expensive homes have a larger weight in the index, while FHFA is equally
weighted and therefore lower priced homes have a relatively larger weight compared to CS.
Another difference is that CS only incorporates houses that actually changed owners, while
FHFA uses transactions in addition to appraisals from refinancing activities and therefore is
based on more observations. FHFA and CS also consider data from varying sources, as CS
uses public records data from county assessor offices while FHFA’s source of data is from
Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae and therefore only includes conventional loans. One major
disadvantage–and the reason why the FHFA index was chosen for all results in our main
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specification–is that the Case-Shiller Index is only available for 20 U.S. cities, as opposed to
the 75 cities that are covered by the FHFA index.
Table 3.7 shows results using the CS index instead of the FHFA index as used in the
main results. The sample size is considerably smaller because there are only 20 cities tracked
in the CS index compared to the 75 cities in the FHFA index, but the results are similar.
Current LTV ratio is positively related to public school enrollment, and negatively related
to private school enrollment. Similarly, the percent of borrowers with no equity is positively
related to public enrollment and negatively related to private. While these results are not
statistically significant, the point estimates are in the expected direction and magnitudes are
very similar.
Also consistent with previous results, eligibility for HELOCs is positively related to pri-
vate school enrollment and negatively related to public school enrollment. Therefore, the
intuitive results are the same: when homeowners experience negative housing wealth shocks,
students are likely to substitute away from more expensive private institutions to less expen-
sive public institutions. This result is consistent across multiple measures of housing wealth
using multiple housing price indices.
3.4.2 IV Estimation
Lovenheim (2011) utilized Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) to test the impact of
housing wealth on college enrollment. Because Lovenheim (2011) utilized micro-data, he cor-
rectly assumed that housing wealth is not exogenous to enrollment decisions, as unobservable
family characteristics will impact both the enrollment decision of the children as well as the
housing decisions. In order to address this issue, Lovenheim (2011) used a household’s short
run housing wealth change, which occurs due to the overall housing market and is therefore
considered exogenous, as an instrument for its home equity level. While I will not discuss
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Table 3.7: Robustness Check Using Case-Shiller Index.
Current LTV Percent No Equity HELOC High HELOC Low
Public Private Public Private Public Private Public Private
Ln(CS Average 0.0540 -0.0314
Current LTV ratio)t−1 (0.0961) (0.147)
CS Percent of 0.114 -0.208
Borrowers With No Equityt−1 (0.135) (0.227)
CS Mean -0.0123∗ 0.000365
potential HELOC amount (high)t−1 (0.00577) (0.0114)
CS Mean -0.0149∗ 0.000443
potential HELOC amount (low)t−1 (0.00701) (0.0138)
Ln Avg Wage -0.636 -0.829 -0.570 -1.062 -0.343 -0.802 -0.343 -0.802
Unskilled Workerst (0.691) (1.443) (0.747) (1.201) (0.772) (1.388) (0.772) (1.388)
Year Trend 0.0233 0.0539 0.0197 0.0661∗ 0.0194 0.0519 0.0194 0.0519
(0.0285) (0.0433) (0.0316) (0.0348) (0.0276) (0.0426) (0.0276) (0.0426)
Observations 232 958 232 958 232 958 232 958
All Standard errors clustered at CBSA level. School level FE and metro specific percent of workers with college degree and percent of
workers that are white are used in all regressions. Coefficients not shown. All schools that did not report enrollment for all years between
2001 and 2010 and schools with less than 50 first year-first time students are excluded.
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the rational for such an instrument here, I do argue that the use of such an instrument is
not appropriate in the context of this paper for two reasons. First, I am not utilizing house-
hold level data for enrollment, but instead observing enrollment at colleges and universities.
Therefore, if endogeneity biases our estimates, it is not for the same reasons as Lovenheim
(2011), but instead due to endogeniety at the metro level. Second, I argue that the magni-
tude of the housing crash in a metro area is not determined by educational attainment in
that area as is discussed below. In other words, the severity of the housing crash is exoge-
nous to college enrollment at the metro area. For these reasons I do not find it necessary
to employ IV estimation, and therefore, our OLS estimates present an unbiased estimate of
the relationship between housing market characteristics and college enrollment decisions.
3.4.3 Exogeneity of Housing Wealth on College Enrollment
For all empirical specifications, I assume that the magnitude of the change in housing wealth
during the financial crisis is exogenous to college enrollment in a metro area. In other
words, I assume that the number of students enrolled at colleges or universities within a
metro area is not related to whether or how severely an area was hit by the crisis. If areas
with relatively higher college enrollment levels and a larger workforce associated with the
local colleges and universities are impacted differently than areas with relatively less college
enrollment, then the magnitude of the shock to housing wealth might be impacted by the
level of enrollment in an area. In other words, the shock to housing wealth might not be
exogenous to college enrollment in a metro area. This can be thought of as the “college town
effect,” where potentially college towns that have a large number of students and university
faculty might not be impacted as severely during a real estate crash due to the presence of
the large universities.
While I am not aware of any literature that links whether a metro area is a “college town”
to the severity of the housing market collapse, I examine the relationship between the ratio
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of the number of college/university employees to total employment in the metro area pre-
housing market collapse and the magnitude of the collapse. I also examine the relationship
between the ratio of enrollment17 to total employment in the metro area to the magnitude
of the collapse. I would hypothesize that “college towns” that have a large number of faculty
and students compared to the total workforce might be impacted less severely by the crisis.
While there are 75 cities tracked by the FHFA index, not all of these metro areas have
available data during this time period in QWI. Therefore, only 48 cities are included in this
analysis. As an additional robustness check, I test whether the percent of workers within
the metro area that have a college degree pre-collapse is a predictor of the magnitude of the
crash. Figure 3.4 shows the graphical relationship between the saturation of workforce that
Figure 3.4: The Relationship Between the Percent Change in FHFA-HPI and Percent of
Workforce Employed by Colleges and Universities.
is employed by colleges and universities and the change in HPI during the housing crash.
There appears to be a positive, but relatively weak relationship, indicating that college towns
17I use the number of the first-year first-time freshmen consistent with previous results as a percent of the
total workforce pre-collapse and the magnitude of the collapse as measured by the change in the FHFA-HPI.
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might have been impacted less heavily than towns in which colleges and universities make
up a smaller portion of the workforce in the area.
Table 3.8 presents empirical results. As can be seen, there is a positive, but not statisti-
cally significant relationship between the percent of workers in an area that are employed by
colleges and universities pre-recession and the magnitude of the crash. This is not surpris-
ing given the graphical relationship presented in Figure 3.4. I estimate that a 1 percentage
point increase in university employees as a percent of the workforce is associated with a 3.7
percentage point smaller change in FHFA-HPI in that area. To put this into perspective,
the average college/university employees as a percent of total workforce is 2.5 percent.18 So,
a 1 percentage point increase from 2 percent to 3 percent, per say, is very large. Further-
more, the average change in HPI in these cities was about 10.7 percent, with a relatively
large standard deviation of 18.1 percent. Therefore, a 1 percentage point increase in the
college/university workforce as a percent of total workforce in a metro area is associated
with about .35 of a standard deviation in the change in HPI.
Table 3.8: Pre-recession Education Levels and the Change in LTV Ratio.
Change HPI Change HPI Change HPI
University 3.704
Employees as Percent of Workforce (2.277)
Enrollment as 3.638
Percent of Workforce (3.137)
Percent College -0.177
Degree (0.437)
Observations 48 48 48
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors shown. Demographic controls including the percent
white, black and Hispanic are included in all regressions but coefficients not shown.
As also presented in Table 3.8, there is a positive but statistically insignificant relationship
between the size of the first-year first-time college enrollees in a metro area and the change in
the FHFA-HPI. Again, this result is not statistically significant, but the economic significance
18As shown in Table 3.1
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can be debated. The average college enrollment as a percent of workforce in a metro area
is approximately 1.4 percent, thus a 1 percentage point change is again very large. This
magnitude and interpretation is very similar to the previous result. Table 3.8 also estimates
the relationship between the percent of the workforce with a college degree pre-collapse and
the magnitude of the change in HPI. This coefficient is not statistically significant and is
relatively close to zero.
Because there are only 48 cities for which both the FHFA-HPI is available and QWI
labor market and demographic data are available, the lack of statistical significance of these
estimates is not surprising. I am aware of no previous research that has estimated whether
metro areas that are “college towns” are less susceptible to housing crashes, and thus this
would be an interesting topic for future research. The point estimates here are in the direction
that is expected: college towns were less impacted by the crash, but this analysis provides
essentially no statistical power.
The question that is relevant for this research though, is whether this potential “college
town” effect can lead to bias in the results. I argue that this is unlikely for two reasons.
First, the potential source of endogeneity here is on total enrollment throughout a metro
area. My analysis, though, focuses specifically on schools located within these metro areas.
Furthermore, I exploit the variation between public and private schools that are located
within the same metro area. Therefore, while the magnitude of the housing crash might
be impacted by the total college presence in an area, I am still observing different types
institutions (i.e. private and public) within the same metro area, and these institutions are
consistently impacted differently. If the college town effect is strong, it cannot explain why
I observe different effects on different types of institutions.
Second, according to the college town effect hypothesis the level of total enrollment or
total college/university employment can impact the severity of the housing crisis. It does
not, however, make a prediction about the relationship between change in enrollment and
change in housing wealth within an area. All empirical specifications incorporate school-level
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fixed effects, and so any correlation between the total enrollment in an area and the change
in housing wealth are accounted for in the empirical specification.
Table 3.9 shows the list of metro areas that are included in this analysis. These cities are
all large or midsize cities. Therefore, while some likely have a large college presence, none
of these cities are primarily composed of a college or university. For instance, the housing
market might be impacted heavily by the presence of a college in a very small town with a
large university. For example, the “college town effect” might be very strong in a city such
as Manhattan Kansas that has less than 60,000 permanent residence but is home of Kansas
State University which has a student body of over 27,000 students. These relatively small
towns are not covered by the FHFA index and therefore are not included in my sample.
Future research might find that the magnitude of the housing crisis was impacted by
whether a metro area was saturated with colleges and universities, but it is unlikely that
this leads to bias in my results.
3.5 Conclusions
I find that the housing crisis impacted private and public schools in very different ways. I
find that increases in different measures of housing wealth within a metropolitan area are
associated with increases in college enrollment at private schools, whereas declines in housing
wealth are associated with increases in public school enrollment. These results are robust
over multiple measures of housing wealth including loan to value ratios, eligibility for home
equity line of credits, as well as measures of financial distress such as mortgage delinquency
and foreclosure.
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Table 3.9: Metro Areas and Percent Change in FHFA HPI
City State % ∆ HPI City State % ∆ HPI
Albany-Schenectady-Troy NY 3.8% Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington MN-WI -19.3%
Albuquerque NM 3.0% Nashville-Davidson–Murfreesboro TN 4.9%
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Marietta GA -13.3% New Haven-Milford CT -11.2%
Austin-Round Rock-San Marco TX 20.4% New Orleans-Metairie-Kenner LA -5.1%
Bakersfield-Delano CA -45.4% Oklahoma City OK 8.5%
Baltimore-Towson MD -11.1% Omaha-Council Bluffs NE-IA -4.08%
Birmingham-Hoover AL 5.8% Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford FL -35.8%
Bridgeport-Stamford-Norwalk CT -13.6% Phoenix-Mesa-Glendale AZ -40.9%
Buffalo-Niagara Falls NY 9.7% Pittsburgh PA 8.2%
Charlotte-Gastonia-Rock Hill NC-SC 7.5% Portland-Vancouver-Hillsboro OR-WA -2.8%
Cincinnati-Middletown OH-KY-IN 4.5% Providence-New Bedford-Fall River RI-MA -17.7%
Cleveland-Elyria-Mentor OH -13.6% Raleigh-Cary NC 10.4%
Columbus OH -6.1% Richmond VA -3.9%
Dayton OH -5.7% Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario CA -48.5%
Fresno CA -41.5% Rochester NY 3.6%
Hartford-West/East Hartford CT -6.5% Sacramento-Arden-Arcade-Roseville CA -44.5%
Honolulu, HI -3.2% St. Louis MO-IL -3.6%
Houston-Sugar Land-Baytown TX 13.7% Salt Lake City UT 6.6%
Indianapolis-Carmel IN -3.8% San Antonio-New Braunfels TX 7.1%
Jacksonville FL -21.0% San Diego-Carlsbad-San Marcos CA -32.7%
Kansas City MS -5.9% San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara CA -20.2%
Las Vegas-Paradise NV -55.8% Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater FL -35.1%
Louisville-Jefferson County KY 0.04% Tucson AZ -22.1%
Memphis TN-MS -8.3% Tulsa OK 9.4%
Milwaukee-Waukesha-West Allis WI -7.5% Virginia Beach-Norfolk-Newport News VA-NC -7.5%
% ∆ HPI is the percent change in the FHFA Housing Price Index between 2005 and 2009 (pre
and post crash). Large negative numbers indicate that a metro area was impacted heavily by the
housing crash.
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The results of this research are of particular interest when compared to the literature
on the cyclicality of schooling (Dellas and Koubi, 2003; Dellas and Sakellaris, 2003; Berger
and Kostal, 2002; Black and Sufi, 2002; Card and Lemieux, 2000; Light, 1996; Betts and
McFarland, 1995; Kane, 1994; Corman, 1983; Gustman and Steineier, 1981). These studies
have found that college enrollment is counter-cyclical; i.e. that recessions lead to increases
in college enrollment due to the decreased opportunity cost of attending college. In this pa-
per, I find that the housing crisis, although associated with a time period where net college
enrollment increased, created substitution from public to private schools, and therefore ac-
tually lead to an increase in enrollment to public schools, likely at the expense of a decrease
in enrollment at more expensive private schools. A likely mechanism for this substitution
is due to changes in the housing wealth of parents who might provide financial support for
their children’s educational expenses.
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Chapter 4. Summary and Conclusions
4.1 The Effect of Merit-Based Scholarships on Educational Outcomes: An
Analysis of the Arizona AIMS Scholarship
The second chapter of this dissertation presents estimates of the impact of the Arizona
AIMS scholarship on a variety of educational outcomes at Arizona’s three largest in state
public institutions: Arizona State University, University of Arizona, and Northern Arizona
University. I find that first-year first-time freshmen enrollment increased by about 15 percent.
Enrollment effects were largest for Northern Arizona University which saw an estimated
25 percent increase in enrollment due to the scholarship. Enrollment effects were larger
for women than for men and were particularly strong for African American and Hispanic
students as enrollment increased by 25 percent and 21 percent respectively.
While enrollment increased due to the implementation of the scholarship, tuition and fees
also increased. I find an estimated 16-19 percent increase in tuition and fees at Arizona’s
three universities due to the scholarship. This result is intuitive: because some students’
education is heavily subsidized, the aggregate price sensitivity is reduced.
Results are robust to both a difference-in-differences specification and the use of synthetic
control groups. Additional robustness checks are presented to account for serial correlation
and asymptotically refined standard errors are employed to mitigate concerns about small
sample size.
4.2 Housing Wealth and College Enrollment
The third chapter of this dissertation takes advantage of the financial crisis which created
an exogenous shock to housing wealth. Cities which had large decreases in housing wealth
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after the financial crisis experienced a decrease in enrollment at private institutions compared
to similar cities that were not impacted heavily by the crisis. On the other hand, cities that
were impacted heavily by the crisis experienced increases in enrollment at public institutions.
Thus, students likely substituted away from more expensive private schools as their parents’
experienced negative shocks to housing wealth.
I extend this analysis to a number of housing wealth indicators including loan to value
ratios and access to home equity lines of credit as well as foreclosures and consistently find
that negative shocks to housing markets are associated with increases in public enrollment
at the expense of private enrollment even after controlling for average low skilled wages and
other metro level characteristics.
4.3 Concluding Remarks
It is clear that there has been an increase in societal preference for higher education, and
that this has lead to both increases in enrollment as well as increases in federal and state
subsidizes for college. These subsidies, in return, have led to an increase in enrollment and
an increase in tuition and fees. This feedback effect likely cannot continue forever.
This dissertation also shows that increases in home ownership–and consequently housing
wealth–can also lead to an increase in college enrollment. This was likely also a contributing
factor to the increase in demand for higher education observed over the last generation. As
a result of these facts, college enrollment and tuition and fees has increased steadily over the
past 30 years.
As tuition and fees continue to increase, and more students graduate from college with
substantial student loans, it is unclear whether this new generation will continue to insist
that its children obtain a college education at any cost. Will the United States experience a
change in public perception about the importance of a college education? Furthermore, after
the recent real estate bubble and collapse, families are less certain about the value of their
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home. Will this make families less likely to leverage housing wealth to fund their children’s
education?
It is unclear to me whether college enrollment as a percent of college age students will
continue to rise in the United States. Over the next 30 years we will observe whether we
have entered into a new era of history where college enrollment is considered a cornerstone
of a successful life or if the generation in which I grew up will be known as the “college
generation.”
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